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THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN
CONSTITUTIONAL THEOR Y
J. Joel Alicea*
Although the role of emotion in law has become a major field of scholarship, there
has been very little attention paid to the role of emotion in constitutional theory. This
Article seeks to fill that gap by providing an integrated account of the role of emotion
within the individual, how emotion affects constitutional culture, and how
constitutional culture, properly understood, should affect our evaluation of major
constitutional theories.
The Article begins by reconstructing one of the most important and influential
accounts of emotion in the philosophical literature: that of Thomas Aquinas. Because
Aquinas’s description of the nature of emotion accords with modern science and the
insights of many law-and-emotion theorists, it provides a firm foundation for an
analysis of emotion in constitutional theory. Having laid that foundation, the Article
examines the role of emotion in constitutional culture, the subset of national culture
concerned with a constitution. Constitutional culture combines a society’s ideas about,
and emotional attachments to, its constitution. Here, the Article develops a novel
synthesis between Aquinas’s model of emotion and Edmund Burke’s sophisticated
exploration of the importance of emotion in constitutional culture. Burke argues that
theories of constitutional legitimacy shape constitutional culture and must accord with
it. If a theory of legitimacy is at odds with a society’s constitutional culture, the society
risks the instability of the regime. This insight—which is consistent with Aquinas’s
model of emotion—is the primary basis for understanding the role of emotion in
constitutional theory.
Finally, the Article turns its attention to constitutional theory. Observing that
popular sovereignty is the theory of legitimacy endorsed by our constitutional culture,
the Article argues—based on the synthesis of the Thomistic and Burkean accounts—
that emotion should play an important role in evaluating the contours and viability of
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theories of legitimacy. Theories of legitimacy that accord with popular sovereignty have
a stronger argument in their favor because they reinforce the emotional attachments
that lend stability to our Constitution. Theories of legitimacy that reject popular
sovereignty, by contrast, must be modified or abandoned or, alternatively, must explain
why attempts to change our constitutional culture will avoid the instability that the
Thomistic and Burkean accounts would predict. The Article therefore has particular
relevance to assessing radical constitutional theories—whether from the political right
or the political left—that are critical of American constitutional culture. The Article
concludes by exploring the implications of emotion for constitutional doctrine, focusing
on stare decisis and the examples of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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INTRODUCTION
In the last three decades, law-and-emotion has become a
voluminous, well-established field within legal scholarship,1 featuring
some of the academy’s most important and influential scholars.2 This
1 For overviews of the history of law and emotions scholarship, see Kathryn Abrams
& Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1997, 2003–13 (2010);
Terry A. Maroney, The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 629,
652–56 (2011).
2 See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF
EMOTIONS (2001); Martha L. Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 CARDOZO
L. REV. 37 (1988).
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development of law-and-emotion literature has proceeded in parallel
with significant developments in the philosophy and science of
emotions,3 with philosophers like Martha Nussbaum integrating
insights from the social and natural sciences into their study of the role
of emotion in law.4 That study has implicated many different areas of
law, especially criminal law.5
Yet, there has been a curious lack of scholarship on the role of
emotion in constitutional theory. With a few notable exceptions,6
“constitutional theor[ists] ha[ve] largely ignored a voluminous body
of empirical and theoretical literature about emotion that has
accumulated over the past [thirty] years.”7 There are many potential
explanations for this. One explanation is that, because American
constitutional theory focuses on a constitution born during the
Enlightenment, it is influenced by Enlightenment-era notions of
reason, in which “emotion was thought to be both more primitive and
at war with rationality.”8 Another explanation could be that American
constitutional theory has, for the last forty years, been framed as a
debate between originalists and non-originalists,9 and because one of
the major themes of that debate has been the originalist argument that
non-originalism is devoid of principle,10 non-originalists have
attempted to demonstrate the logical rigor of their theories.11 Both
sides of the debate in constitutional theory, therefore, have had a
strong incentive to emphasize the rationality of their views, which

3 See NICHOLAS E. LOMBARDO, THE LOGIC OF DESIRE: AQUINAS ON EMOTION 8–15
(2011); Jamal Greene, Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1389,
1415–19 (2013); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in
Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 275–97 (1996); Maroney, supra note 1, at 642–51.
4 See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 1–138.
5 See Abrams & Keren, supra note 1, at 2003–13; see, e.g., Kahan & Nussbaum, supra
note 3.
6 See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Exploring the Affective Constitution, 59 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV.
571 (2009); Doni Gewirtzman, Our Founding Feelings: Emotion, Commitment, and Imagination
in Constitutional Culture, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 623 (2009); Greene, supra note 3; Terry A.
Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 851 (2009);
Lawrence B. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 475 (2004).
7 Gewirtzman, supra note 6, at 625; see also Greene, supra note 3, at 1393.
8 Maroney, supra note 1, at 634; see also Gewirtzman, supra note 6, at 635–44.
9 See J. Joel Alicea, Liberalism and Disagreement in American Constitutional Theory, 107
VA. L. REV. 1711 (2021).
10 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, Interpreting the Constitution, in SCALIA SPEAKS:
REFLECTIONS ON LAW, FAITH, AND LIFE WELL LIVED 188, 196–97 (Christopher J. Scalia &
Edward Whelan eds., 2017); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 1–11 (1971).
11 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 176–275 (1986); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE
LIVING CONSTITUTION 1–49 (2010).
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might seem inimical to considering the role of emotion in
constitutional theory.
Those few constitutional scholars who have considered the role of
emotion in constitutional theory—while making significant contributions—have not changed the contours of the debate within the field.
For example, Jamal Greene focuses on how emotion functions as a
form of rhetoric in judicial opinions.12 Doni Gewirtzman offers a few
suggestions about how emotion might affect debates within constitutional theory,13 but his focus is less on constitutional theory and more
on constitutional culture.14 Constitutional culture is the part of a
national culture that relates to the society’s constitution,15 and while it
is crucial to thinking about constitutional theory, the implications of
constitutional culture for constitutional theory require sustained
attention. Finally, Lawrence Solum’s application of virtue ethics to
constitutional theory has important potential implications for the role
of emotion in constitutional theory because of Aristotle’s understanding of the relationship between emotion and virtue,16 but his work does
not make emotion its primary focus.17
To show that emotion is relevant to constitutional theory, what is
needed is an integrated account that examines the role of emotion
within the individual human person, how emotion affects constitutional culture, and how constitutional culture, properly understood,
should affect our evaluation of major constitutional theories. Such an
account must draw from the deep tradition of philosophical reflection
on the nature of emotion while also being consistent with insights from
the modern science of emotion.
Offering that account is my task in this Article, and although the
role of emotion in constitutional theory is a novel question in modern
scholarship, I want to suggest that the answer to it can be found by
developing a new synthesis of old sources. The relationship between
reason, emotion, and the will is not a new question; nor is the
relationship between emotion and constitutional culture. What is new
is the need to harmonize the answers to those questions and apply the
resulting account to modern American constitutional theory.

12 See Greene, supra note 3, at 1414–46.
13 See Gewirtzman, supra note 6, at 677–83.
14 See id. at 647–77.
15 See Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003). Unlike Post’s
definition, I will not distinguish between the culture within the judicial system and the
culture outside the judicial system.
16 Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 65, 70–74, 86 (2006).
17 See id. at 89–91; Solum, supra note 6, at 502–22.
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To do that, we have to begin by examining the role of emotion
within the individual human person, since the role of emotion within
constitutional theory depends on how emotion functions within the
individuals governed by a constitution. Here, we can look to one of
the most important and influential answers to that question ever
offered: that of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas’s model of the emotions—
his explanation of how reason, emotion, and the will relate to each
other—draws upon the philosophical arguments of Aristotle,
Augustine, and the Stoics, while also anticipating many of the insights
from modern science.18 Aquinas argues that our character traits form
when our emotional dispositions align with what we believe to be true
through reason, and those traits—depending on whether they are
aligned with right reason or with error—are virtues or vices.19
This essential insight from Aquinas’s model of emotion provides
us with the foundation for assessing the role of emotion in
constitutional culture, and here again, we can draw from an old source
to answer our novel question, for it was partly in response to what he
perceived as the French revolutionaries’ lack of appreciation for the
role of emotion in constitutional culture that Edmund Burke wrote
Reflections on the Revolution in France.20 There, Burke provides one of
the most sophisticated theories ever developed about the ways in which
emotions form, and are formed by, constitutional culture. Just as
Aquinas argues that individuals form stable character traits through the
alignment of their reason, emotion, and will, Burke argues that
constitutional cultures form stable character traits through the
alignment of a society’s reason, emotion, and will.21 He describes the
ways in which societies use symbols, images, rituals, and customs—what
Burke calls “the wardrobe of a moral imagination”22—to cultivate the
affections toward a constitution that create settled character traits in
the constitution’s favor, thereby lending it stability over time.23
Burke contends that theories of constitutional legitimacy—
theories that explain why members of a polity have a moral obligation
to obey their constitution (written or unwritten) and the laws enacted
under it—play a key role in forming constitutional culture. And just
as Aquinas sees war between reason and emotion as producing
instability within the individual,24 Burke argues that a mismatch
18 See infra Part I.
19 See infra Section I.C.
20 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (J.G.A. Pocock ed.,
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1987) (1790).
21 See infra Section II.A.
22 BURKE, supra note 20, at 67.
23 See infra Section II.B.
24 See infra Section I.C.
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between constitutional culture and theories of legitimacy—a
misalignment of emotion and reason—creates instability within a
constitutional culture, potentially leading to disastrous consequences.25 If a constitution is to remain stable, it must be supported
by a theory of legitimacy that is woven into the fabric of a constitutional
culture.26 By developing a novel synthesis of the Thomistic model of
emotion and the Burkean account of constitutional culture, we can see
that there is a close connection between emotion, theories of
constitutional legitimacy, and the stability of a regime.
If that conclusion is right, then emotion should play a significant
role in evaluating theories of legitimacy, since it is morally relevant that
some theories of legitimacy might imperil the Constitution’s stability.27
It also becomes important to know which theory of legitimacy accords
with the emotional dispositions woven into our constitutional culture,
and I suggest that popular sovereignty is that theory.28 It follows that
theorists who wish to avoid destabilizing our regime and advocate
theories of legitimacy at odds with popular sovereignty would need to
abandon or modify their theories or would need to explain how our
constitutional culture can and should change to conform to their
theories without compromising the emotional attachments that
sustain the Constitution.29
Examples of constitutional theories that might change because of
the role of emotion in evaluating theories of legitimacy include the
legal-positivist theories of Richard Fallon, William Baude, and Stephen
Sachs.30 Their theories depend on an accurate assessment of our
society’s constitutional practices, and once we understand the essential
role that popular sovereignty plays in forming the emotional attachments that are bound up with our constitutional practices, there is a
strong argument that these positivistic theories must embrace popular
sovereignty as their theory of legitimacy.31
The implications are even more acute for radical constitutional
theories that are critical of America’s constitutional culture, such as
the nascent constitutional theory being developed by Adrian
Vermeule, which seeks to root out the liberal philosophical tradition
(broadly understood) that is integral to our constitutional culture.32 If

25 See infra Sections II.C, III.A.
26 See id.
27 See infra Section III.A.
28 See id.
29 See infra subsections III.B.2–B.3.
30 See infra subsection III.B.2.
31 See id.
32 See Adrian Vermeule, Beyond Originalism, ATLANTIC (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www
.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/common-good-constitutionalism/609037/
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such radical theories were adopted, would the result be the erosion of
“those inbred sentiments which are the faithful guardians, the active
monitors of” the Constitution,33 thereby destabilizing the American
regime?34 Understanding the role of emotion in constitutional theory,
then, raises difficult questions for those who would seek to change our
constitutional culture.
My argument about the role of emotion in constitutional theory
is a departure from the way many law-and-emotion theorists tend to
think about the role of emotion in law. Much of law-and-emotion
scholarship has come from critical race or feminist scholars and legal
realists who focus on the role of emotion in legal decisionmaking and
argue that judges or juries should take their own emotions or those of
the litigants into account.35 My argument, by contrast, is focused on
the role of emotions at the societal level and how those emotional
dispositions support or imperil a regime.36 This is a difference over
whose emotions we are discussing: this Article is focused on society’s
emotions, not the judge or litigant’s emotions.37 Indeed, I reject the
notion that emotions should play any conscious role in judicial
decisionmaking,38 though I will not flesh out that argument in this
Article. My focus, instead, will be on building an integrated account
of emotion within the individual, in constitutional culture, and in
constitutional theory.
Because Aquinas’s model of emotion is the foundation for that
account, that is where I will begin. Part I describes Aquinas’s model of
emotion and the relationship between emotion, reason, and the will.
Part II reconstructs Burke’s account of emotion in constitutional
culture and develops a new synthesis with Aquinas’s model. Part III
then turns to constitutional theory. Section III.A again relies on Burke
to argue that theories of legitimacy play a key role in the formation of
constitutional culture and suggests that popular sovereignty is the
theory of legitimacy endorsed by our constitutional culture. Sections
III.B and III.C draw out the implications of emotion for constitutional
theory. Section III.B argues that theories of legitimacy that are at odds
with popular sovereignty must be abandoned or modified or must
[https://perma.cc/4TEQ-3GVE]. For a discussion of the different strands of liberalism,
see Alicea, supra note 9.
33 BURKE, supra note 20, at 75.
34 See infra Section III.C.
35 See Abrams & Keren, supra note 1, at 2003–13.
36 Gewirtzman’s article takes a step in this direction. See Gewirtzman, supra note 6, at
677–83.
37 Solum’s work tends to focus more on judicial decisionmaking, though his theory
certainly has implications for other constitutional actors. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue
Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178 (2003).
38 See infra Section III.A.
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explain how they would maintain the stability of our Constitution if
adopted. Section III.C will briefly argue that understanding the role
of emotion in constitutional theory helps illuminate the relationship
between originalism and stare decisis, using Miranda v. Arizona39 and Roe
v. Wade40 as examples.
One important caveat: although I will set forth an integrated
account of the role of emotion in constitutional theory, it is certainly
not a comprehensive account. Much more can and should be said about
each of its three components: emotion in the individual, in
constitutional culture, and in constitutional theory. For example,
there is a voluminous literature on the issue of constitutional
legitimacy,41 and while Part III focuses on the principal implications of
emotion for theories of legitimacy, it would require a significantly
more extended discussion to work out the full ramifications. This
Article, then, is only the first step toward developing a comprehensive
account of emotion in constitutional theory.
Finally, as in any discussion of emotion, there is the notorious,
threshold problem of how to define “emotion.”42 Do emotions include
bodily appetites like hunger and thirst, or are those appetites
categorically different from emotions like anger and joy?43
Fortunately, my argument about the relevance of emotion to
constitutional theory does not require a precise definition of emotion.
Whatever the outer limits of the concept of “emotion” may be, hope,
despair, fear, anger, love, and other passions identified by Aquinas are
in its heartland,44 and the reader need only keep this conventional
understanding of emotion in mind while reading what follows.
I hope to show that understanding the role of emotion in
constitutional theory does not entail abandoning constitutional
theory’s commitment to reason. Rather, it is because of our commitment to reason that we must understand the role of emotion in
constitutional theory.

39 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
40 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
41 See infra notes 274–81.
42 Greene, supra note 3, at 1414–19; Carlo Leget, Martha Nussbaum and Thomas
Aquinas on the Emotions, 64 THEOLOGICAL STUDS. 558, 571 (2003); Susan A. Bandes,
Introduction, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 1, 10 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); see also LOMBARDO,
supra note 3, at 8.
43 NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 129–37.
44 See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I-II Q. 23 art. 4 (Fathers of the Eng.
Dominican Province trans., Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd. 2d rev. ed. 1920) (c. 1270),
https://www.newadvent.org/summa/; ROBERT MINER, THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE
PASSIONS: A STUDY OF SUMMA THEOLOGIAE IA2AE 22–48, 62–63 (2009); Leget, supra note 42,
at 572; Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 276.
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EMOTION IN THE INDIVIDUAL

My argument is that emotion should play an important role in
constitutional theory because it plays a vital role in maintaining the
stability of a regime over time. That will require an explanation of the
role of emotion in constitutional culture, which is the subject of Part
II, and since a constitutional culture is composed of individuals, we
must first describe the role of emotion within the individual.
That is a topic of enormous complexity, and I do not pretend that
we can fully understand it. The best we can hope to achieve is a rough
approximation of reality: a model of the emotions. Some scholars—
such as Nussbaum—have constructed their own models.45 I will instead
use the model of the emotions proposed by Thomas Aquinas, for three
main reasons.
First, in terms of historical importance and influence, few
accounts of the emotions rival Aquinas’s. When Aquinas published his
account of the passions as part of the Summa Theologiae, it was likely
“the longest sustained discussion of the passions ever written” to that
point.46 Its comprehensive, systematic nature—and its integration of
prior landmark works by Aristotle, Augustine, and the Stoics47—has
meant that, “[d]irectly or indirectly, modern thinkers are responding
to [Aquinas’s] . . . conception of the passions.”48
Second, Aquinas’s account is generally consistent with the
“ascendant” understanding of emotions in the natural and social
sciences.49 Aquinas’s model builds on—and modifies—Aristotle’s
account in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Rhetoric, and as the
psychologist Richard Lazarus once said, “[I]n the last decades
psychology has fought its way back to the place where Aristotle was
when he wrote the Rhetoric.”50 Although modern psychology “do[es]
not directly lead toward embracing Aquinas’s [philosophy],” there are
certainly “affinities between Aquinas and contemporary research” with
respect to major points of dispute in the philosophy of emotions.51 I
will identify some of those affinities as I describe Aquinas’s model,

45 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 1–138.
46 LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 1; see also id. at 1–3, 49.
47 Leget, supra note 42, at 569.
48 MINER, supra note 44, at 1.
49 See Greene, supra note 3, at 1450; see, e.g., Maroney, supra note 1, at 643–44 & nn.64–
75 (collecting sources); Gewirtzman, supra note 6, at 650–57 & nn.169–224 (same);
NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 100–19 & nn.28–76 (same); Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 3,
at 284–301 & nn.45–127 (same).
50 Leget, supra note 42, at 576 (citing NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 94 & n.13, which has
a similar quote by Lazarus).
51 Id.
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though my emphasis will be more on the philosophical aspects of
Aquinas’s model than on the scientific bases for it.
Why not just rely on science to construct the model? Insofar as
this objection presupposes a materialistic view of human nature (or at
least of human emotions) by which we are reducible to things like
biological or chemical processes, I would reject that (very
controversial) premise, though this is of course not the place to make
the argument against it.52 With Anthony Kenny, I believe that “there
will always remain an irreducible core” of questions about the mind
and emotions “amenable only to philosophy.”53 Insights from science
are essential, but as Robert Miner has observed, “[a] competent
physicist can give an exact acoustical account of a piece of music,
delineating its mathematical substructure in precise terms.”54 Yet,
“[s]uch an account, while useful for any number of purposes, is not
the same as understanding a piece of music as a musician understands
it.”55 Our emotions cannot be explained solely by social or natural
science, just as music cannot be explained solely by mathematical
structures. Rather, a multidisciplinary approach is required in which
philosophy, science, and other fields play their part. This is consistent
with the approach taken by the most important literature on law and
emotion.56
Third, Aquinas’s account of the emotions is persuasive. His
arguments are compelling, and his model accords with what I believe
are widely held intuitions about, and experiences with, the ways in
which reason, emotion, and the will interact. Unfortunately, I cannot
reproduce Aquinas’s arguments in the limited space I have here. They
are dense and situated within a broader philosophical framework of
extraordinary complexity. Instead, my method will be to sketch out
Aquinas’s model,57 offer examples that I hope will accord with the
reader’s own experiences, and note some of the places where his views
are supported by modern science and arguments made by other
philosophers, such as Nussbaum. This makes for a less complete
argument, to be sure, but it is no less complete than those offered by
constitutional theorists who assume the correctness of legal

52 See Edward Feser, Kripke, Ross, and the Immaterial Aspects of Thought, 87 AM. CATH.
PHIL. Q. 1 (2013).
53 ANTHONY KENNY, AQUINAS ON MIND 5 (1993); see also id. at 1–13.
54 MINER, supra note 44, at 2.
55 Id.
56 See, e.g., Greene, supra note 3, at 1398–99, 1447–51; Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note
3, at 280–97.
57 I will not, for example, discuss the distinction between concupiscible and irascible
passions, even though that is an important feature of Aquinas’s model. See AQUINAS, supra
note 44, at I Q. 81 art. 2; LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 50–74; MINER, supra note 44, at 46–57.
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positivism58 or aspects of John Rawls’s political liberalism.59 For readers
interested in the arguments Aquinas offers to justify his model, I
recommend reading the portions of the Summa and the secondary
literature on which I rely.
Some readers might object to my use of Aquinas’s model because
it is embedded within his larger theological system of thought, which
many readers will not share. That objection, though understandable,
is misguided. As Nicholas Lombardo has observed, the theological
components of Aquinas’s system “in no way imply that Aquinas’s
account of emotion is comprehensible only from the perspective of his
faith and therefore of interest only to Christian theologians.”60 Rather,
“much of Aquinas’s account of emotion is intelligible and rigorous
from a philosophical perspective” that does not presuppose theism,
though of course his account will have even greater significance for
those who share his theology.61
On the other hand, some may object to my presentation of
Aquinas’s model of emotion because I disaggregate it from his
theological framework and do not focus much on his understanding
of the good, which causes his account to lose much of its richness.
There is something to this criticism, but it is an inevitable consequence
of the narrower ambit of my argument (emotion, rather than the good
in general) and my desire to present Aquinas’s account in a manner
that is acceptable to as broad an audience as possible, which in no way
implies a disparagement of Aquinas’s theology.62
In setting forth Aquinas’s model, I have omitted discussion of
other potential models, except to note a few places where modern lawand-emotion scholarship converges with, or diverges from, Aquinas’s.
A survey of other models would require a great deal of space while
doing little to advance my argument. Interested readers may consult
useful overviews of the literature noted here63 and explore other
models.
58 See, e.g., William Baude, Essay, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349,
2364–65 (2015); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L.
REV. 535, 547–49 (1999).
59 Lawrence B. Solum, The Constraint Principle: Original Meaning and Constitutional
Practice 30–35 (Apr. 3, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file at https://ssrn.com
/abstract=2940215 [https://perma.cc/DT8Y-BCXZ]).
60 LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 7.
61 Id.
62 See John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Fides et Ratio §§ 73–74, HOLY SEE (Sept. 14, 1998),
https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc
_14091998_fides-et-ratio.html [https://perma.cc/3NEY-5UKW]; see also JOHN FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 48–49 (2d ed. 2011).
63 See Greene, supra note 3, at 1397–99, 1414–19, 1447–51; Abrams & Keren, supra
note 1, at 2003–13; Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 275–301.
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Far from desiring more exploration of various models of emotion,
some readers may wish I said less about Aquinas’s model and arrived
more quickly at the discussion of constitutional theory in Part III. But
there is simply no way to present a plausible argument in favor of the
role of emotion in constitutional theory without first presenting a
model of emotion in the individual, since the relationship between
reason, emotion, and the will in the individual—and the way in which
a person’s character is formed—is the key to understanding the role
of emotion in constitutional theory. It is common for law-and-emotion
scholars to begin their arguments with an explanation of the role of
emotion within the individual, and I am simply following that standard
approach here.64
Finally, as noted above, any account of emotion confronts the
threshold problem of defining what we mean by “emotion,” and while
I have already described the conventional understanding that I invoke
here, the problem takes on a different aspect with respect to Aquinas.
For although I have been loosely referring to Aquinas’s model of
“emotion,” “emotion has been an important psychological category
only since the early nineteenth century,”65 so that “the word ‘emotion’
has no direct parallel in the Latin vocabulary of the thirteenth
century.”66 “Aquinas speaks frequently of passiones and occasionally of
affectiones, but never of ‘emotions.’”67 Here, I will follow the lead of
several prominent scholars of Aquinas who have argued that the
modern concept of “emotions” is very similar to Aquinas’s understanding of “affections”68—of which “passions” are a subset. Any nuances
that may be lost by making such an equivalence do not affect my overall
argument. To understand Aquinas’s account of emotions, then,
requires an explanation of his concept of affections, to which I now
turn.
A. Appetite and Apprehension
Aquinas’s model of the emotions begins with a description of our
appetites. By an “appetite,” Aquinas means “an inclination of a person

64 See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 1–138; see also Gewirtzman, supra note 6, at 647–
57; Greene, supra note 3, at 1398–99, 1414–19; Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 275–
301.
65 LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 8.
66 Id. at 15.
67 MINER, supra note 44, at 4.
68 LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 224–27; MINER, supra note 44, at 35–38 & n.6; Leget,
supra note 42, at 574.
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desirous of a thing towards that thing.”69 It is “a reaching forth, a
stretching toward some kind of object.”70 That a person desires the
object tells us something important, since “[t]he essence of goodness
consists in this, that it is in some way desirable.”71 That we desire
something shows that it is good in some way,72 and it is desirable “only
in so far as it is perfect” or complete, “for all desire their own
perfection.”73 An appetite therefore “names the universal tendency of
anything to seek what completes it.”74
Being drawn toward the good necessarily means being drawn away
from that which is not good, “since avoiding evil is itself a good.”75 So
although an appetite is always a reaching forth for some good, it might
manifest itself in any given case by repelling from the object in
question.76 Since appetites are the foundation of emotions, this
explains why emotions can either be oriented toward some object (e.g.,
hope) or away from some object (e.g., fear).77
Notice that an appetite has an end (a telos) and is necessarily objectoriented (though the object need not be a material object).78 It reaches
out for a thing, and it does so because the thing will help complete the
person who has the appetite.79 It follows that an appetite is only

69 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I-II Q. 8 art. 1; see also LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 26;
MICHAEL S. SHERWIN, BY KNOWLEDGE & BY LOVE: CHARITY AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE MORAL
THEOLOGY OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 21 (2005).
70 MINER, supra note 44, at 16.
71 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I Q. 5 art. 1.
72 Id.; see also ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. I, at 1094a1–3 (Roger Crisp ed.
& trans., Cambridge Univ. Press rev. ed. 2014) (c. 384 B.C.E.). Nussbaum hits on a similar
idea when she says that emotions are eudaimonistic. NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 31–33, 49–
56.
73 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I Q. 5 art.1; ARISTOTLE, supra note 72, bk. I, at 1097a15–
30; see also MINER, supra note 44, at 16–17.
74 MINER, supra note 44, at 16; see also LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 26–27. Nussbaum’s
description of emotions as having a close connection to “vulnerability”—that is, the
emotions show that we value something outside of our control—bears some similarities to
Aquinas’s description of appetites. NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 43–44; Leget, supra note 42,
at 575.
75 MINER, supra note 44, at 26 (quoting WILLIAM A. WALLACE, THE MODELING OF
NATURE: PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE IN SYNTHESIS 174 (1996)).
76 Id.
77 LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 63.
78 MINER, supra note 44, at 63–65; see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 27; Errol
Bedford, Emotions, 57 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 281, 291 (1957); George Pitcher, Emotion,
74 MIND 326, 326–27 (1965). Aquinas’s description of emotion as object-oriented is
consistent with Aristotle’s. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE ART OF RHETORIC bk. II, at 1378a31–
37 (Robin Waterfield trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2018) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (describing anger as
being directed “at a particular individual”).
79 For a description of the role of love in Aquinas’s conception of appetite, see
SHERWIN, supra note 69, at 72–81.
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activated or triggered when it has apprehended or grasped a desirable
object (or apprehended a bad object, which causes the appetite to
reach for the object’s opposite and away from the object).80 Otherwise,
the appetite remains dormant or passive.81 We do not, for example,
experience anger, sadness, or joy simultaneously and at all times; we
experience these emotions only when they are activated by some
object.
This is what Aquinas means when he says that “the appetible does
not move the appetite except as it is apprehended”82 or that “appetite
follows apprehension.”83 By “apprehension,” Aquinas means that the
reality and significance of the object is grasped or understood by the
person to whom it is presented. Miner helpfully describes this
dynamic: “Apprehension brings the thing to us, as it were . . . .
Appetite, by contrast, moves us toward the thing itself.”84 We can
represent the order of the relationship this way:
Apprehension → Activation of Appetite

For example, suppose that I see a stranger slap my friend across
the face without provocation. I apprehend—both in perceiving what
occurred and understanding its significance—the event, which
triggers my appetite (in this case, the appetite manifests itself as anger)
and moves me toward the object of my appetite (in this case, I am
drawn to avenge my friend against the stranger). Anger is a particularly complex emotion,85 so this example is oversimplified, but it gives
a sense of the distinction between apprehension and appetite.
Implicit in all this is that the appetites require an evaluation of the
object,86 a point now well-accepted in the scientific, philosophical, and
law-and-emotion literature.87 We do not necessarily have the same

80 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I Q. 79 art. 2, 80.2; LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 31.
81 LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 34–37; MINER, supra note 44, at 58–59; Leget, supra
note 42, at 572.
82 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I Q. 80 art. 2.
83 Id. at I Q. 79 art. 1.
84 MINER, supra note 44, at 13–15; see also Pitcher, supra note 78, at 332–33.
85 See AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I-II Q. 46 art. 2; ARISTOTLE, supra note 72, bk. IV, at
1125b–1126b10.
86 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 78, bk. II, at 1378a31–37 (reasoning that a person
becomes angry “because of something the individual has done or was intending to do to
him or those dear to him”).
87 See Maroney, supra note 1, at 643–44 & nn.64–75 (summarizing pertinent studies);
NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 100–19 (same); Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 282–86;
Pitcher, supra note 78, at 333–35; Bedford, supra note 78, at 292–96. Nonetheless, the
notion that emotion depends on evaluation is contrary to the conception that prevailed
through much of the twentieth century. See, e.g., William James, What is an Emotion?, 9 MIND
188, 189–90 (1884). For a useful summary of contending theories of emotion, see Greene,
supra note 3, at 1416–19; LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 8–15.
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emotional response to the same object at all times. Rather, our
responses depend on our evaluation of the goodness of the object
within a given context. Perhaps, in my example above, I knew that my
friend and the stranger were playing a game in which they would slap
each other across the face with increasing severity until one of them
gave up and paid the other some amount of money for losing the
game. My emotional response to the same event—the slap across my
friend’s face—is unlikely to trigger the emotion of anger since I have
apprehended the object in a different way than I did before.
Because our appetites are object-oriented and require
apprehension to become active, Aquinas is able to identify three types
of appetites, only two of which concern us here.88 The first appetite is
the sensory appetite, which seeks “some particular good” and is
activated by apprehension that relies on the senses.89 Fundamentally,
the sensory appetite seeks what is either “pleasant or useful.”90 The
other appetite is the rational appetite—also called the “will”—which is
“inclined towards good in general” and is activated by apprehension
that relies on the intellect.91 It seeks the good simpliciter, which is
“goodness itself, or else some action that is suitable for attaining that
end.”92 Thus, the two appetites are (at least) distinguishable based on
the object of their desire (the sensory appetite pursues only particular
goods, while the rational appetite pursues the good as such) and the
manner of apprehension (the apprehension that triggers the sensory
appetite relies on the senses, while the apprehension that triggers the
rational appetite relies on the intellect).93 The sensory appetite, via the
senses, will pursue the particular good of a steak, while the rational
appetite, via the intellect, will pursue the good of wisdom.94 The latter
can only be apprehended as a good apart from particular, material

88 MINER, supra note 44, at 13–15. The third appetite—the natural appetite—might
appear to be in tension with my simplified depiction since it does not require apprehension
on the part of the being to whom the appetite belongs. See LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 31–
32 & nn.52–53. But, as Miner points out, this seeming contradiction is resolved by Aquinas
by relying on divine apprehension. MINER, supra note 44, at 19–21. In any event, I think
my simplification is justified—even if one rejects Aquinas’s theistic attempt to reconcile the
natural appetite with the requirement of apprehension—since my argument does not
concern the natural appetite.
89 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I Q. 59 art.1, 80.2.
90 MINER, supra note 44, at 22.
91 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I Q. 59 art. 1, Q. 82 art. 5; SHERWIN, supra note 69, at 21–
22. This is overstating things a bit since the rational appetite takes in information through
the senses as well.
92 MINER, supra note 44, at 24.
93 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I Q. 80 art. 2; SHERWIN, supra note 69, at 25; see
ARISTOTLE, supra note 72, bk. III, at 1117b28–1118a2.
94 See KENNY, supra note 53, at 59.
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objects, since it is an abstract and universal good worth pursuing for its
own sake.95
These distinctions in apprehension point toward distinctions in
cognitive faculties. Aquinas argues that there are two forms of
cognition: sensory cognition (which pertains to the sensory appetite)
and intellectual cognition (which pertains to the rational appetite).96
For our purposes, the form of sensory cognition with which we are
concerned is called “particular reason,” since it is a form of reason
concerned with the particular good to which the sensory appetite is
directed, while intellectual cognition involves reasoning about abstract
and universal concepts, in line with the rational appetite’s desire for
universal goods like wisdom.97 These cognitive faculties conduct the
evaluation necessary for apprehension of an object and activation (or
nonactivation) of an appetite.98
TABLE 1: APPETITES
Sensory

Rational (the Will)

Sensory cognition

Intellectual
Cognition

Particular Reason

Intellect

Having introduced the idea of “particular reason,” I hasten to
clarify that it should not be confused with “universal reason.”99
Universal reason is where “in syllogistic matters particular conclusions
are drawn from universal propositions.”100 It is “the locus of abstract
thought,”101 where we move from premises to conclusions about
nonmaterial matters like morality. This is the form of reasoning to
which we usually refer in everyday speech when we speak of “reason.”
95 For a more extended discussion of the distinction between the sensory and rational
appetites, see MINER, supra note 44, at 21–25.
96 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I Q. 78 art. 4, Q. 79 arts. 1–2; LOMBARDO, supra note 3,
at 21–24, 32–33; MINER, supra note 44, at 76–82.
97 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I Q. 78 art. 4, Q. 79 arts. 1–2; LOMBARDO, supra note 3,
at 21–22; MINER, supra note 44, at 76–82.
98 See Pitcher, supra note 78, at 335–37.
99 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I Q. 81 art. 3.
100 Id.
101 LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 97.

2022]

THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

1161

Particular reason, by contrast, is a lower-level, more primitive form of
reasoning that does not deal in universal principles or abstractions; it
reasons only about concrete, particular things taken in through the
senses (though it also makes use of nonmaterial information like
whether an object is useful).102
Although universal reason can affect the sensory appetite by
influencing particular reason (as I will discuss below), it has a much
closer connection to the will (what I have been calling the “rational
appetite”). Aquinas says that the intellect is “apprehensive of universal
being and truth,” and understood that way, the intellect is the rational
appetite’s counterpart to particular reason: it performs the intellectual
cognition that “moves the will.”103 But intellect and universal reason
“are the same power,” in the sense that “[r]easoning”—by which
Aquinas means universal reason—“is compared to understanding [or
the intellect], as movement is to rest, or acquisition to possession.”104
In other words, the intellect is our ability to understand things, and
reasoning is how we come to understand them.105 Thus, universal
reason has a tight relationship with the will: insofar as our reason
understands something to be desirable, it activates the will to seek the
desirable thing.106
The activation of an appetite leads to what Aquinas calls
“affections,” which I have stipulated (based on the work of Aquinas
scholars) is the rough equivalent to our modern concept of emotions.107 The activation of the sensory appetite results in what Aquinas
calls a “passion,” which is a subcategory of affections.108 Strictly
speaking, passions do not accompany the activation of the rational
appetite,109 but another form of affection results. For example,
Aquinas says that pleasure results from the satisfaction of either a
sensory appetite or a rational appetite, but whereas the satisfaction of
the sensory appetite results in a passion felt through the senses, the
satisfaction of the rational appetite results in an affection known as
“joy,” which is a subspecies of pleasure that does not necessarily involve

102 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I Q. 81 art. 3; LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 24; MINER,
supra note 44, at 69–82.
103 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I Q. 82 art. 4. Aquinas notes that the relationship
between the intellect and the will is complex, in that each can “move” the other depending
on the sense in which we are considering them. See SHERWIN, supra note 69, at 25–38.
104 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I Q. 79 art. 8; see also id. at I Q. 59 art. 1; KENNY, supra
note 53, at 18.
105 LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 97.
106 Id. at 78; KENNY, supra note 53, at 41–42; SHERWIN, supra note 69, at 39–45.
107 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
108 LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 75–77; MINER, supra note 44, at 35–38.
109 MINER, supra note 44, at 35–38.
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the senses.110 We can represent the ordering of these processes as
follows:
Apprehension → Activation of Appetite → Affection

While these clean divisions are helpful for understanding the
relevant concepts, it is important to note that there are many
complications that I have not described. For example, although only
the rational appetite is drawn to goodness as such, it may “second[]”
or agree with the sensory appetite’s desire for some particular good
and can “share[] in the sense appetite’s pleasure by seconding it,”111
and the sensory appetite can be activated based on the good pursued
by the rational appetite through a process called “overflow.”112 But we
need not delve into these complications, since they are not important
to my argument.
What matters is that emotions are the result of the activation of
either the sensory or rational appetite, an activation that occurs after
the apprehension of some object, which involves an evaluation of the
goodness of an object using either sensory cognition (particular
reason) or intellectual cognition (the intellect).
B. Activation of the Appetites
All of this will be easier to understand by examining Aquinas’s
description of the triggering of an emotion, which will also set up the
discussion of the relationship between reason, emotion, and the will in
Section I.C below. I will focus on the sensory appetite because I have
already provided a high-level description of the activation of the
rational appetite in the preceding section.
The activation of the sensory appetite (which results in the species
of emotion called passion) begins with the taking in of sensory
information.113 That information is synthesized by what Aquinas calls
the “common sense” so that we can discern what the object is,114 but if
that is all that occurred, we would have the same emotional reaction
(or none at all) to the same object regardless of context. Instead,
Aquinas argues that our imagination (“a storehouse of forms received
through the senses”) and our memory (“a storehouse of” our prior
evaluations of the good or evil of a particular form) allow us to place
the current form into a broader context by “collat[ing]” what we are

110 LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 85–86. It can, however, overflow into the sensory
appetite. See id. at 107.
111 Id. at 84–85.
112 Id. at 89–93; MINER, supra note 44, at 103–05.
113 See AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I Q. 78 art. 4.
114 Id.
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perceiving with previous forms.115 Our sensory cognition (particular
reason) evaluates the goodness of the current form based on this
collation of forms.116 The product of “perception colored by cognitive
evaluation” is called an “intention,”117 and we apprehend the object
based on the intention,118 which then activates the sensory appetite
(that is, produces a passion).119 A simplified flow diagram would look
like this:
Sensory Data →
Synthesize Using Common Sense →
Collate Previous Data and Evaluations Using
Imagination/Memory →
Evaluate Using Particular Reason →
Form an Intention →
Apprehend through Intention →
Passion

An example will help illuminate this. Suppose I am walking in the
woods one day and spot a large bear nearby. My common sense takes
in and synthesizes the form of the bear, and this form is collated with
images and other sensory data relating to bears that I have previously
evaluated and that are stored in my imagination and memory.
Suppose that I have seen, read, or heard of previous bear attacks in the
woods, so that these prior forms are collated with what I am seeing
now. My particular reason will evaluate these forms, judge the bear to
be dangerous, and present that intention. I will apprehend that the
bear is dangerous through that intention, and my sensory appetite will
be activated to produce the passion of fear. In Lombardo’s words, “It
is not the perception of an object per se that elicits passion, but the
perception of an object grasped under a certain aspect.”120
It is worth repeating that this depiction of the passions is
oversimplified. “This logical progression should not be understood as
a chronological progression; the formation of an intention typically

115 Id.; see NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 64–67.
116 See AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I Q. 78 art. 4.
117 LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 21, 24; see also AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I Q. 78 art. 4.
118 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I-II Q. 22; LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 22; see NUSSBAUM,
supra note 2, at 27–31.
119 See AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I Q. 78 art. 4. For a more detailed explanation of the
process described in this paragraph, see LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 20–25, 34; MINER, supra
note 44, at 58–87; see also ROMANUS CESSARIO, INTRODUCTION TO MORAL THEOLOGY 100–
48 (2001).
120 LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 25.
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occurs simultaneously with perception.”121 But it provides a rough
sense of how Aquinas thinks about the passions.
C. Reason, Emotion, and the Will
We are now in a position to understand the relationship between
reason, emotion, and the will under Aquinas’s model, which will be
important to my argument in Parts II and III. 122 Emotion, as we have
seen, is the result of a cognitive evaluation. Two important implications follow from this.
First, an emotion can be unreasonable or mistaken.123 Going back
to my example of my friend being slapped across the face, if I had been
unaware that he and the stranger were playing a game when I saw the
slap occur, I would get angry, but while that anger would be reasonable
based on what I knew at the time, it would be objectively unreasonable
given the actual state of the facts (i.e., they were just playing a game, so
there is no reason to be angry at the stranger for the slap). This is why
Aristotle can say that virtue partly consists in “hav[ing] [an emotion]
at the right time, about the right things, towards the right people, for
the right end, and in the right way.”124
Second, emotions can be changed due to a change in our cognitive
evaluations of objects,125 a conclusion borne out by modern science.126
Suppose I walked in just as my friend was slapped across the face,
without knowing that a game was being played, and I became angry.
But then another friend told me about the game. I would probably no
longer be angry, and the reason is that my evaluation of the situation
has changed in light of new facts. As Aquinas says, “Anyone can
experience this in himself: for by applying certain universal
considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or
excited.”127

121 Id. at 22–23.
122 Some will object to the framing of this discussion because of its assertion that reason
and emotion are separable. Nussbaum, for instance, has argued that cognitive evaluations
are not only necessary to an emotion; they are all that an emotion is. See NUSSBAUM, supra
note 2, at 56–64; see also Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 293–95. Although Nussbaum
makes a plausible case for her view, it is not Aquinas’s view, and for reasons described by
both Lombardo and Miner, I believe Aquinas’s view is more likely correct. See LOMBARDO,
supra note 3, at 224–27; MINER, supra note 44, at 4–5, 99.
123 NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 46–49; Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 286–88;
Pitcher, supra note 78, at 329–31; Bedford, supra note 78, at 292–96.
124 ARISTOTLE, supra note 72, bk. II, at 1106b20–23, 1106b37–1107a8.
125 Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 293–95; Pitcher, supra note 78, at 345–46.
126 See Maroney, supra note 1, at 648–49.
127 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I Q. 81 art. 3.
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It is easy to see how emotions that result from movement of the
will are influenced by reason. As described above, the will is moved by
the intellect, and Aquinas often describes the will and intellect as so
interconnected that they “can be considered as together constituting
a single principle.”128 Since the intellect and universal reason are the
same cognitive power, it follows that the relationship between the will
and universal reason is very close indeed. Insofar as, through the
exercise of reason, we come to see that something we previously viewed
as undesirable is in fact desirable, our will should be activated to
produce the emotion of joy when we obtain the thing desired.129 We
can represent the relationship this way:
Universal Reason → Intellect → Will

The situation is more complicated with respect to the passions,
the emotions that result from the movement of the sensory appetite.
Aquinas says that reason may influence the passions in two ways.130
First, because it is a lower-level form of reasoning, “particular reason is
naturally guided and moved according to the universal reason.”131
Recall that a passion can only be triggered after apprehension, and we
apprehend things based on intentions produced (in part) by particular
reason’s evaluation of sensory data. By changing particular reason’s
evaluation of some object, we can change the intentions produced, the
way in which the object is apprehended, and the passion that results
(or that does not result).132 My example of being angry until I learn
that my friend is playing a slapping game is a straightforward instance
of my universal reason determining that, in light of the fact that a game
is being played, I have no cause to be upset with the stranger, which
influences my particular reason to evaluate the same action (my friend
being slapped by the stranger) differently when it occurs again minutes
later.133 We can represent the relationship as follows:
Universal Reason → Particular Reason → Passions

The second way in which reason can influence the passions is
through the will. Aquinas points out that, unlike other animals that
take action as soon as they feel a passion, humans can feel a passion
and yet not act on it, and he attributes this to the will.134 “The
tendencies of the sens[ory] appetite present themselves to the will in
128 LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 81.
129 Id. at 78.
130 LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 94–98; Robert C. Roberts, Thomas Aquinas on the
Morality of Emotions, 9 HIST. PHIL. Q. 287, 288–90 (1992).
131 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I Q. 81 art. 3.
132 LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 96–98.
133 See id. at 239.
134 See id. at 24–25, 239; Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 288.
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order to be executed; they cannot force themselves on the subject
without the will’s consent.”135 Because the will is closely connected to
reason, reason can prevent the passions from being acted upon.136
This seems to be what Aquinas means when he says “the sensitive
appetite is subject to the reason, not immediately but through the
will.”137 We can think about the relationship this way:
Universal Reason → Intellect → Will → Passions

Irrespective of the manner in which reason influences emotions,
the very fact that it does so means that emotions are not inherently
irrational. Rather, insofar as they are guided by reason, they are
“rational by participation.”138 That is not to say that they are
“essentially” rational; they are only rational insofar as they are guided
by reason and therefore “participat[e]” in reason.139
But now we come to the crucial caveat: because the passions
operate according to their own, distinct form of reasoning (i.e.,
particular reason), neither universal reason nor the will can force the
passions to conform to universal reason. To illustrate the point,
Aquinas borrows an analogy taken from Aristotle’s Politics.140 Aristotle
contrasts “despotic” and political (i.e., “constitutional”) rule.141
Despotic rule characterizes the relationship between master and slave,
while political rule characterizes the relationship between a leader and
free individuals.142 Aquinas deploys the analogy to describe the
relationship between reason and the passions: “But the [passions] . . .
do not obey the reason blindly; on the contrary, they have their own
proper movements, by which, at times, they go against reason,” which
is why Aristotle says that “the ‘reason rules the [passions] . . . by a
political command’ such as that by which free men are ruled, who have
in some respects a will of their own.”143 Aristotle makes a similar point
135 LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 98. But see id. (“Elsewhere [Aquinas] clarifies that this
general rule does not always apply: in unusual circumstances, as when there is bodily
indisposition, the passions can overwhelm the will.” (citing AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I-II,
Q. 10 art. 3)).
136 See AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I Q. 81 art. 3; ARISTOTLE, supra note 72, bk. III, at
1113b3–14.
137 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I-II Q. 46 art. 4.
138 Id. at I-II Q. 56 art. 4, Q. 56 art. 6, Q. 60 art. 1; see LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 94–
95; Leget, supra note 42, at 574.
139 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I-II Q. 60 art. 1; see also ARISTOTLE, supra note 72, bk. I,
at 1102b13–30.
140 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS bk. I, at 1254a–1254b (B. Jowett trans., London, Oxford
Univ. Press 1885) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I-II Q. 56 art. 4 (quoting a version of ARISTOTLE, supra
note 140, bk. I, at 1254b).
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when he argues that our appetite “has reason in the sense that a person
who listens to the reason of his father and his friends is said to have
reason.”144 As Lombardo has observed, Aquinas can be understood as
suggesting that “the passions operate independently of reason, but
nonetheless are inclined to obey it, and yet if reason attempts to rule
the passions [despotically] . . . , the passions will erupt in rebellion.”145
Thus, while the relationship between reason and the passions can
be tempestuous, it need not be, and when the passions (or the
affections of the will) are oriented in the same direction as reason, they
powerfully reinforce it,146 as shown in the scientific literature.147 This
requires that emotions—which are passive—be repeatedly acted upon
and moved by reason: “For everything that is passive and moved by
another, is disposed by the action of the agent; wherefore if the acts be
multiplied a certain quality is formed in the power which is passive and
moved, which quality is called a habit . . . .”148 Habit-formation, in
turn, requires the use of the will,149 since the will, when moved, results
in the emotions associated with the rational appetite150 and is the
means by which reason governs the emotions associated with the
sensory appetite.151
“As individuals respond to particular events and establish patterns
of interaction between passion and reason, character traits emerge.”152
These are not necessarily good traits. Habits are formed when
emotions conform to reason through the will, but that does not
guarantee that they are formed by right reason.153 A person whose
universal reason has erred and who conditions their emotions to
conform to their error will develop bad habits.154 These good and bad

144
145

ARISTOTLE, supra note 72, bk. I, at 1102b29–1103a1.
LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 100; see also MINER, supra note 44, at 93–96, 107–08;
SHERWIN, supra note 69, at 108–09.
146 Aquinas is clearer about this with respect to the passions, but as Lombardo observes,
the same is true of the intellectual affections. See LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 243–44.
147 Maroney, supra note 1, at 644–45.
148 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I-II Q. 51 art. 2; see also id. at I-II Q. 50 art. 3. Aquinas is
not endorsing an understanding of virtue as nothing more than repeated acts. See ROMANUS
CESSARIO, THE MORAL VIRTUES AND THEOLOGICAL ETHICS 34–38 (2d ed. 2009). A habitus
is an acquired disposition toward acting in a particular way, such that doing so “becom[es]
choice and delight.” Id. at 35 (quoting Fifteen Sermons, in 2 THE WORKS OF JOSEPH BUTLER
74 (W.E. Gladstone ed., London, Oxford Univ. Press 1896) (1726)).
149 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I-II Q. 50 art. 5 (habit “is principally related to the will”).
150 MINER, supra note 44, at 35–38.
151 See AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I-II Q. 46 art. 4.
152 LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 101.
153 Id. at 103; see Maroney, supra note 1, at 648–49.
154 See AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I-II Q. 75 art. 4; CESSARIO, supra note 148, at 38–42.
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habits are, simply put, virtues and vices.155 Emotions are thus essential
to the attainment of virtue in its truest sense, since the alignment of
reason, emotion, and the will toward the good is a more perfect state
than the constant internecine warfare of reason and emotion.156 Thus,
a virtuous person—far from being devoid of emotion—will have strong
emotional responses in favor of that which right reason identifies as
good.157
And just as reason can give wayward emotions a proper
orientation toward the good, rightly ordered emotions can influence
universal reason toward the good.158 A person whose emotions have
been properly habituated to reason can experience an emotion
pointing toward the good that universal reason has more trouble
grasping through a syllogism.159 This “affective knowledge” can, of
course, lead reason astray if the emotions are not properly habituated,
but in a real though limited way, a person whose emotions have been
habituated to the good has two means of discerning the correct course
of action: moving from premise to conclusion through the use of
universal reason, or having a habituated disposition toward the good
that manifests itself in an emotional response.160 And emotion may
run out ahead of universal reason in some instances and identify the
correct course before universal reason has a chance to catch up,161
though, as I stressed above, the intellect and particular reason must
accord with right reason for them to have identified the correct course.
Reason and emotion, then, interact in complex ways that belie any
notion that the former is good and the latter is bad. When opposed to
each other, they can cause turmoil; when aligned with each other, they
can form character. The key question is what type of character is
formed.

155 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I-II Q. 55 art. 1, Q. 75 art. 4; ARISTOTLE, supra note 72,
bk. II, at 1103a14–1103b25; see also LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 104–05, 242.
156 See AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I-II Q. 59 art. 5; ARISTOTLE, supra note 72, bk. II, at
1105b20–1106a13 (virtue is a “state”); see also LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 40–43, 103–08;
MINER, supra note 44, at 6–7, 90–94.
157 See AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I-II Q. 59 art. 5; see also LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at
106–08.
158 See LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 105–06; MINER, supra note 44, at 97–99; SHERWIN,
supra note 69, at 110–11; Thomas Ryan, Revisiting Affective Knowledge and Connaturality in
Aquinas, 66 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 49, 50–51 (2005).
159 See Ryan, supra note 158, at 53–60; Daniel C. Maguire, Ratio Practica and the
Intellectualistic Fallacy, 10 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 22, 26–29 (1982).
160 Ryan, supra note 158, at 51, 60–62; see AQUINAS, supra note 44, at II-II Q. 45 art. 2.
161 See Ryan, supra note 158, at 66. See generally Jacques Maritain, On Knowledge Through
Connaturality, 4 REV. METAPHYSICS 473 (1951).
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D. Contra Aquinas?
Because Aquinas’s model of emotions is the foundation for the
remainder of this Article, some may reach this point and ask: What if I
disagree with Aquinas? What implications are there for the rest of the
Article?
The reader need not agree with all aspects of the Thomistic model
I have presented to agree with my argument that emotion should play
an important role in constitutional theory. The most significant
features of Aquinas’s model of emotions—at least for purposes of my
argument—are broadly accepted by law-and-emotion theorists and by
modern science, namely: emotions (1) are object-oriented,162 (2)
depend on an evaluation,163 (3) are capable of being changed by
modifying how one evaluates an object,164 and (4) when aligned with
one’s reasoning, create powerful reinforcement for reason that
establishes stable character traits.165 Different theorists may frame
these claims differently,166 but insofar as readers can sign onto these
widely endorsed propositions, they should be able to agree with the
gist of my argument below.
Of course, these propositions, so stated, are merely assertions.
They only become understandable and defensible when situated
within a broader model of emotion, which is why such a model is
necessary to my argument. But a reader who subscribes to a different
model that includes those propositions can join in much of what I will
argue in the remainder of this Article.
II.

EMOTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE

With Aquinas’s model of emotion in mind, we can now move from
the individual level to the societal level by turning to the role of
emotion in constitutional culture. My goal in this Part is to synthesize
Aquinas’s model of emotion and Burke’s account of emotion in
constitutional culture, a synthesis that has not previously been
developed by scholars. As noted, constitutional culture is the part of a
national culture that relates to the society’s constitution.167 Its
162 NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 27; Pitcher, supra note 78, at 326–27; Bedford, supra
note 78, at 291.
163 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 100–19; Bedford, supra note 78, at 292–96; Kahan &
Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 282–86; Maroney, supra note 1, at 643–44; Pitcher, supra note
78, at 333–35.
164 See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 293–95; Maroney, supra note 1, at 648–49;
Pitcher, supra note 78, at 345–46.
165 See Gewirtzman, supra note 6, at 650–57; Maroney, supra note 1, at 644–45.
166 See, e.g., Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 293–301.
167 See Post, supra note 15, at 8.
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contours will become clearer in the discussion that follows, but it is a
mixture of ideas and emotional dispositions that are widely shared by
a people with respect to their constitution. I will rely on Burke’s
account of constitutional culture for four reasons, which largely track
the reasons I rely on Aquinas.
First, and most importantly, because any account of constitutional
culture must be consistent with an account of emotion within the
individual, it is essential that Burke’s account is—as I will argue—
consistent with Aquinas’s. Intuitively, it makes sense that emotion
would play a similar role on a societal level that it does within the
individual. Society, after all, is composed of individuals, and since
Aquinas sees the individual as inherently social and political,168 his
model of the emotions in the individual should carry through to the
social and political realms. Nonetheless, some readers may wonder:
Why would a British, post-Reformation politician in the late eighteenth
century have a view of emotion consistent with that of Aquinas? As
Peter Stanlis has observed, Burke was steeped in Aristotelian
philosophy, including the Ethics,169 upon which Aquinas based many of
his insights about the role of emotion in the individual.170
Aquinas and Burke knew that reason and emotion can both be led
astray, but they also saw that emotion was essential for the formation
of character and can, in some instances, see the good more easily than
reason. At the same time, they emphasized the need for emotion to
be habituated by reason so that it is oriented toward the good. But
while Aquinas primarily advanced these arguments at the level of the
individual, Burke did so at the level of society. This Part therefore
provides the bridge from discussing emotions within the individual to
discussing emotions within constitutional theory, which will be the
subject of Part III below.
Second, Burke’s account of constitutional culture is one of the
most sophisticated in the history of political theory,171 in part because
he was writing in response to an era of increased revolutionary activity
(and, most immediately, the French Revolution) that posed deep
questions about the fragility of constitutional culture, which is an
unusual context for a great work of political philosophy.172 At the same

168 THOMAS AQUINAS, DE REGIMINE PRINCIPUM (c. 1267), reprinted in AQUINAS:
POLITICAL WRITINGS 5, 5–6 (R.W. Dyson ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (Bk. I,
ch. 1).
169 See PETER J. STANLIS, EDMUND BURKE AND THE NATURAL LAW 35–36, 71 (1958).
170 See Leget, supra note 42, at 569.
171 See WILLIAM F. BYRNE, EDMUND BURKE FOR OUR TIME: MORAL IMAGINATION,
MEANING, AND POLITICS 8–13 (2011).
172 See RICHARD BOURKE, EMPIRE & REVOLUTION: THE POLITICAL LIFE OF EDMUND
BURKE 677 (2015).
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time, Burke brought to his task a lifetime of reflection on
constitutional culture as a theorist and statesman, which made him
well-suited to it.
Third, Burke’s account is compelling, though, as with Aquinas’s
model, I cannot reproduce all the arguments in favor of his account
here.
Finally, like Aquinas’s model of emotion, Burke’s basic insights
about constitutional culture find support from other scholars and
modern science,173 which I will note in passing along the way.
This last point helps answer a similar objection to the one
addressed in Section I.D above: What if the reader disagrees with
Burke’s view of constitutional culture? While many features of Burke’s
political theory are controversial, scholars across the ideological
spectrum share his view that emotions play a crucial role in sustaining
a constitution, even though (as I will argue in Section III.A) they have
largely overlooked the development or implications of this point.174
From Robert Bork to Jack Balkin to David Strauss, constitutional
theorists acknowledge that “political institutions” require “affective
ties” from “many cultural and emotional sources.”175 Gewirtzman
relies primarily on developments in modern science to argue that emotion, by “enhanc[ing] individuals’ ability to maintain commitments
over time by reinforcing habits,” is “critical[] . . . to the continued
legitimacy and survival of constitutional values and institutions.”176
Thus, much as “psychology has fought its way back to the place where
Aristotle was when he wrote the Rhetoric,”177 modern science has
provided support for Burke’s arguments about constitutional culture
in Reflections.
Nonetheless, these points of consensus are insufficient, by
themselves, to construct a framework for evaluating constitutional
theories, which is why Burke’s account is necessary to my argument. I
therefore acknowledge that readers who reject Burke might likewise
have to reject some of the implications that I draw out in Part III. For
example, a reader might agree that emotions play a crucial role in
sustaining constitutional legitimacy but believe, contra Burke, that
changing those emotions does not often result in destabilizing the

173
174
175

See, e.g., Gewirtzman, supra note 6, at 650–57.
See id. at 623–25.
David A. Strauss, Essay, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112
YALE L.J. 1717, 1739 (2003); see also JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 119–20 (2011);
ROBERT H. BORK, Tradition and Morality in Constitutional Law, in A TIME TO SPEAK: SELECTED
WRITINGS AND ARGUMENTS 397, 400 (ISI Books 2008) (1984); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
POLITICAL EMOTIONS: WHY LOVE MATTERS FOR JUSTICE 6 (2013).
176 Gewirtzman, supra note 6, at 625; see also id. at 647–57.
177 Leget, supra note 42, at 576.

1172

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:3

regime, which would affect the evaluation of radical constitutional
theories in subsection III.B.3. But the heart of my argument—that
emotion should play an important role in evaluating constitutional
theories—is one that I believe readers who reject parts of Burke’s
philosophy can nonetheless affirm.
I will start by explaining Burke’s view of how reason, emotion, and
the will interact at a societal level to form a stable national character,
which is where Burke’s and Aquinas’s understandings of emotion
converge. Next, I will discuss how he thinks these societal emotional
dispositions within the political realm are both constitutive of and are
formed by constitutional culture. Finally, I will describe Burke’s
argument that constitutional culture is essential to the stability of a
regime, an argument consistent with Aquinas’s model of emotion.
A. The Formation of National Character
Burke’s defense of tradition and his skepticism of the ability of
individual reason to arrive at sound conclusions about complex
political questions are well known among legal scholars.178
We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private
stock of reason, because we suspect that this stock in each man is
small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves
of the general bank and capital of nations and of ages. 179

He sees tradition as “a form of social knowledge,”180 the deposit of
human reflection on political, economic, and social problems
extended through time. Burke thinks this form of reasoning is at least
equally reliable as the reasoning of any given individual—and probably
more so.181
Notice that Burke is not arguing against reason as such. He is not
a relativist or an emotivist.182 “Leave a man to his passions, and you

178 See STRAUSS, supra note 11, at 40–42; Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 519–21 (1996); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 891–94 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism,
105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 369–72 (2006); Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean
Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 642–50 (1994).
179 BURKE, supra note 20, at 76.
180 ROGER SCRUTON, THE MEANING OF CONSERVATISM 31, 124 (St. Augustine’s Press
rev. 3d ed. 2002) (1980); see KENNETH MINOGUE, THE LIBERAL MIND 53–55 (Liberty Fund
ed. 2000) (1963).
181 See BYRNE, supra note 171, at 28–29.
182 See BOURKE, supra note 172, at 146, 678, 695–98; BYRNE, supra note 171, at 27–28;
YUVAL LEVIN, THE GREAT DEBATE: EDMUND BURKE, THOMAS PAINE, AND THE BIRTH OF
RIGHT AND LEFT 58 (2014); MATTHEW D. WRIGHT, A VINDICATION OF POLITICS: ON THE
COMMON GOOD AND HUMAN FLOURISHING 123–26 (2019). “Emotivism is the doctrine that
all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but
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leave a wild beast to a savage and capricious nature.”183 Like Aquinas,
Burke believes that reason must govern human affairs, but he thinks
that individual reason is likely to err, which is why reason needs to be
tested and sifted through generations before arriving at reliable
conclusions. The nuance of Burke’s position is best understood by
contrasting it with the rationalist position he criticizes, a position aptly
described by Michael Oakeshott:
[The rationalist is] the enemy of authority, of prejudice, of the
merely traditional, customary or habitual. His mental attitude is at
once sceptical and optimistic: sceptical, because there is no
opinion, no habit, no belief, nothing so firmly rooted or so widely
held that he hesitates to question it and to judge it by what he calls
his “reason”; optimistic, because the Rationalist never doubts the
power of his “reason” (when properly applied) to determine the
worth of a thing, the truth of an opinion or the propriety of an
action.184

Burke is thus against rationalism but not against acting rationally. He is
against privileging individual reason above all other sources of
knowledge, such as custom and tradition. And precisely because
customs and traditions are manifestations of propositions whose truth
has been tested through time and that have been found consistent with
the circumstances and culture of a particular society, he is skeptical of
philosophical abstractions that would seek to displace them.185
Less well-known to legal scholars are Burke’s views on emotions
and their importance to constitutional culture. Shortly before and
within the same passage quoted above in which Burke describes “the
general bank and capital of nations and of ages,”186 he argues that
emotions play a crucial role with respect to “morality,” “the great
principles of government,” and the “ideas of liberty.”187 Speaking
again of the British, he observes: “[W]e still feel within us, and we
cherish and cultivate, those inbred sentiments which are the faithful
guardians, the active monitors of our duty, the true supporters of all
liberal and manly morals.”188 Here Burke asserts that certain emotions
expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or
evaluative in character.” ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY
11–12 (3d ed. 2007).
183 Edmund Burke, Speech in General Reply, Second Day: Friday, May 30, 1794, in 11
THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 227, 237 (London, John C.
Nimmo 1887).
184 MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, Rationalism in Politics, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND
OTHER ESSAYS 5, 6 (Liberty Fund, new & expanded ed. 1991) (1962).
185 See BURKE, supra note 20, at 31–36.
186 Id. at 76.
187 Id. at 75.
188 Id.
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must be “cultivate[d]” and “inbred” so that they may serve as “the
active monitors of our duty” and the “true supporters” of morality in
the political realm. Like reason, sentiments must be distilled through
generations to arrive at reliable outcomes.189 These are not artificial
emotions, however; Burke makes clear that the emotions necessary for
a healthy constitutional culture are “natural” and in at least some sense
“untaught.”190 In this, he echoes Aquinas’s argument that emotions
are, by nature, directed toward the good because we seek that which
completes and perfects us,191 but emotions must nonetheless be
conditioned by reason to ensure their proper orientation.192
Burke contends that the interaction of reason, emotion, and the
will leads to the formation of “prejudices.”193 This was a provocative
term even when Burke wrote Reflections,194 and it has an even greater
negative connotation today, so we must be careful to examine what,
exactly, Burke means when he uses it. He describes prejudice in this
way:
Many of our men of speculation, instead of exploding general
prejudices, employ their sagacity to discover the latent wisdom
which prevails in them. If they find what they seek, and they seldom
fail, they think it more wise to continue the prejudice, with the
reason involved, than to cast away the coat of prejudice and to leave
nothing but the naked reason; because prejudice, with its reason,
has a motive to give action to that reason, and an affection which
will give it permanence.195

This passage reveals three important features of prejudice as Burke
understands that term. First, prejudice has “its reason” or “the reason
involved,” a “latent wisdom” that is often unapparent at first glance.196
Prejudice is not, therefore, necessarily irrational, though Burke seems
to concede that, on rare occasions, it might be. Second, prejudice is
not just “naked reason”; it also has an emotional component to it, an
alignment of affection and “the reason involved” that “will give” the
prejudice “permanence.”197 Third, prejudice “has a motive to give

189 See WRIGHT, supra note 182, at 127.
190 BURKE, supra note 20, at 75–76; see also LEVIN, supra note 182, at 59–61.
191 See AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I Q. 5 art. 1; id. at I-II Q. 8 art. 1; see also LOMBARDO,
supra note 3, at 26–27.
192 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I Q. 81 art. 3; MINER, supra note 44, at 81–82.
193 See BURKE, supra note 20, at 76.
194 BYRNE, supra note 171, at 27; see ADAM ADATTO SANDEL, THE PLACE OF PREJUDICE:
A CASE FOR REASONING WITHIN THE WORLD 6, 54 (2014); LEVIN, supra note 182, at 136.
195 BURKE, supra note 20, at 76.
196 Id.
197 Id.
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action to [its] reason.”198 This seems to refer back to the earlier passage in which Burke describes “cultivate[d]” and “inbred sentiments”
that are “the active monitors of our duty.”199 Properly cultivated
sentiments, then, spur us to act upon the “latent wisdom” in our
prejudices.200
This description of prejudice sounds remarkably similar to
Aquinas’s description of the way in which character traits are formed
and result in virtues or vices, and the two accounts can therefore be
synthesized. Recall that, for Aquinas, character traits form when
reason, emotion, and the will are in alignment. For instance, reason
instructs both the rational and sensory appetites, and when a properly
formed sensory appetite results in a passion, the passion proposes a
course of action to the will, which gives its consent and spurs the
person to action.201 For Burke, prejudice is the combination of “the
reason involved” (universal reason), “an affection” (emotion), and
“action”202 (“the command of the will”203). In a passage that could
have been taken from Aristotle or Aquinas, Burke concludes that the
result of prejudice is the formation of habits or character traits that
(when properly formed) are virtues: “Prejudice renders a man’s virtue
his habit, and not a series of unconnected acts. Through just
prejudice, his duty becomes a part of his nature.”204 Just as Aquinas
contends that the virtuous person is conditioned to doing the good
and will therefore be drawn to it even without the exercise of reason,205
Burke argues that prejudice “previously engages the mind in a steady
course of wisdom and virtue and does not leave the man hesitating in
the moment of decision skeptical, puzzled, and unresolved.”206 And
just as Aquinas believes that the alignment of reason, emotion, and the
will is essential to the formation of individual character, Burke believes
that the same alignment—which he calls “prejudice”—is essential to

198 Id.
199 Id. at 75.
200 Id. at 76. Many legal scholars who discuss Burke’s conception of prejudice overlook
the components of emotion and will, focusing exclusively on prejudice’s latent wisdom. See,
e.g., Sunstein, supra note 178, at 369–72.
201 See supra Section I.C.
202 BURKE, supra note 20, at 76. My argument here owes much to Matthew Wright and
William Byrne. The main difference between my analysis and theirs is that I make a novel
and explicit connection between Burke’s thought and Aquinas’s model of emotions.
203 AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I Q. 81 art. 3.
204 BURKE, supra note 20, at 76–77.
205 See supra notes 158–61.
206 BURKE, supra note 20, at 76; see WRIGHT, supra note 182, at 127–28; BYRNE, supra
note 171, at 22–23, 37–38, 79–83.
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the formation of “our national character.”207 Thus, both Aquinas and
Burke emphasize that “[a] well-ordered soul . . . is not one without
passion, but one in which the right sort of passions predominate.”208
Nonetheless, although Aquinas and Burke’s accounts of emotion
can be synthesized with respect to the points discussed above, it is
important not to overstate the extent to which their accounts overlap.
Burke’s most complete description of emotion is found in his earlier
work on emotion and aesthetics, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin
of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful.209 The model that Burke offers
there is far less systematic than Aquinas’s, so it can be difficult to
compare their respective views on key points. But what matters for my
purposes here is that they are consistent with each other on the points
relevant to my argument.210
To be sure, that prejudice contains reason does not mean that
prejudice contains right reason; there can be evil prejudices as well as
good ones.211 When Burke describes the way in which a person’s “duty
becomes a part of his nature,” he says that this happens “[t]hrough
just prejudice.”212 Left unsaid is that an unjust prejudice could make
the dereliction of duty a part of a person’s nature.213 This is why Burke,
while expressing confidence that we will generally find “the latent
wisdom which prevails” in prejudices if we look for it, nonetheless
leaves open the possibility that we will not when he says that we “seldom
fail” to find it.214
Even this might seem overly optimistic. After all, vice is
ubiquitous; why is Burke so confident that prejudices will often result
in virtues? Part of the answer is that Burke has in mind “our old
prejudices,” and “the longer they have lasted and the more generally
they have prevailed, the more we cherish them.”215
Burke retains his skepticism of individual reason and knows that
vice is prevalent in the individual person, but he trusts that societal
prejudices that have endured over time reflect a tradition of thought
and emotion that are likely to be virtuous.
207 BURKE, supra note 20, at 75–76 (emphasis added). Gewirtzman, relying on modern
science, provides a similar description of the role of emotion in the formation of national
character. See Gewirtzman, supra note 6, at 650–57.
208 BYRNE, supra note 171, at 82.
209 See EDMUND BURKE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS OF
THE SUBLIME AND BEAUTIFUL (Paul Guyer ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2015) (1757).
210 But see SANDEL, supra note 194, at 55–66 (arguing that Burke’s conception of
prejudice is opposed to reason).
211 BYRNE, supra note 171, at 39–40, 77–78.
212 BURKE, supra note 20, at 77 (emphasis added).
213 See T.S. ELIOT, AFTER STRANGE GODS: A PRIMER OF MODERN HERESY 18–20 (1934).
214 BURKE, supra note 20, at 76 (emphasis added).
215 Id. (emphasis added).
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Of course, that will not always be the case. The principal reason
why the word “prejudice” has such a negative connotation in the
United States is precisely because of its association with an old tradition
of thought and emotion—racism—that is evil. But while that example
should make us less sanguine than Burke about the virtue of enduring
prejudices, it does not undermine Burke’s general description of what
a prejudice is; nor does it negate the possibility of good prejudices. Our
society has a strong prejudice against cannibalism, for instance, and
that is a very good prejudice.
Indeed, if we understand the word “prejudice” as Burke does,
then just as the individual person will inevitably develop character
traits, a society will inevitably develop prejudices.216 Even if we claim to
disavow prejudices, that is nonetheless adopting, as Hans-Georg
Gadamer once put it, a “prejudice against prejudice.”217 The question
is not, therefore, whether to be for or against prejudices, it is what kinds
of prejudices a society will develop: virtues or vices?218
Under Burke’s theory, therefore, national prejudices are national
traits—combinations of reason, emotion, and the will—that together
constitute a stable national character, which we might also call our
national culture. And just as our character traits are both constitutive
of our character and are shaped by our character, national prejudices
are both constitutive of our national culture and shaped by our national
culture.
B. The Wardrobe of a Moral Imagination
Both in the same section of Reflections described above and
elsewhere in that text, Burke describes the kinds of emotions that help
form the prejudices relating to that aspect of our national culture that
we might call constitutional culture. He is thinking of “awe to kings,”
“affection to parliaments,” “duty to magistrates,” “reverence to
priests” (given the union of church and state in Britain), and “respect
to nobility.”219 Burke’s emphasis on the need for “reverence to our
civil institutions” is telling and must be understood against the
backdrop of his Philosophical Enquiry.220

216 See BYRNE, supra note 171, at 31–33.
217 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 272–73 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald
G. Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 2004) (1960).
218 BYRNE, supra note 171, at 181.
219 BURKE, supra note 20, at 76.
220 Id. at 30; see WRIGHT, supra note 182, at 121–22, 130–31; see also BOURKE, supra note
172, at 119–20; DAVID BROMWICH, THE INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF EDMUND BURKE: FROM THE
SUBLIME AND BEAUTIFUL TO AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 11–12 (2014); BYRNE, supra note 171,
at 41; LEVIN, supra note 182, at 57–58.
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There, Burke describes the emotions triggered by what he calls
“the sublime,” which include, “in its highest degree,” the emotion of
“astonishment,” and in its “inferior effects,” “admiration, reverence,
and respect.”221 The sublime arouses “ideas of pain[] and danger”;222
it is a thing with “a power in some way superior” to our own.223 Burke
provides, as an example of the sublime, “[t]he power which arises from
institution in kings and commanders,” which is why “[s]overeigns are
frequently addressed with the title of dread majesty.”224 Because Burke
believes that “ideas of pain are much more powerful than those which
enter on the part of pleasure,” the sublime “is productive of the
strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling.”225 This
powerful category of emotions “anticipates our reasonings, and
hurries us on by an irresistible force.”226
But Burke does not believe that a healthy constitutional culture
would be founded exclusively on the notions of reverence and awe
associated with the sublime; he also appeals to the “beautiful,” which
is “founded on . . . pleasure,”227 has a “light and delicate”228 aspect, and
“cause[s] love, or some passion similar to it.”229 Constitutional culture
is at its best when
we have given to our frame of polity the image of a relation in
blood, binding up the constitution of our country with our dearest
domestic ties, adopting our fundamental laws into the bosom of our
family affections, keeping inseparable and cherishing with the
warmth of all their combined and mutually reflected charities our
state, our hearths, our sepulchres, and our altars.230

Here, Burke makes a strong connection between the affection we have
for our families and the affection we have for our country and
constitution. In doing so, he draws on a long tradition in political
philosophy about the virtue of pietas, “the virtue that enables us to do
what is right in relation to our family, friends, benefactors, country,
and God.”231 It is a virtue that Aquinas likewise sees as important to

221 BURKE, supra note 209, at 47; see also BROMWICH, supra note 220, at 77 (“For
[Burke], reverence, respect, and fear exist on a single continuum.”).
222 BURKE, supra note 209, at 33.
223 Id. at 53.
224 Id. at 55.
225 Id. at 33–34.
226 Id. at 47.
227 Id. at 101.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 73.
230 BURKE, supra note 20, at 30.
231 James Hankins, Pietas, FIRST THINGS (Nov. 2020), https://www.firstthings.com
/article/2020/11/pietas [https://perma.cc/3SZJ-L6PA].
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the maintenance of a culture of obedience to legitimate civil
authority.232
This might strike us as one-sided love: owed by the people to their
institutions. But Burke emphasizes that the relationship goes both
ways—or at least it did within a lost culture he calls “chivalry.”233 A
healthy constitutional culture “produce[s] a noble equality and
hand[s] it down through all the gradations of social life.”234 It
“mitigate[s] kings into companions and raise[s] private men to be
fellows with kings”; “subdue[s] the fierceness of pride and power”; and
“oblige[s] sovereigns to submit to the soft collar of social esteem.”235
This kind of culture “ma[kes] power gentle and obedience liberal”;
“harmonize[s] the different shades of life”; and “incorporate[s] into
politics the sentiments which beautify and soften private society.”236
The result is a complex, cross-cutting, and almost-indefinable network
of relationships and emotions that bind the people to their
constitution, the rulers to their people, and the people to each
other.237 This chivalrous culture, in Burke’s view, is what had “given its
character to modern Europe” at the end of the eighteenth century.238
How is this kind of constitutional culture created and sustained?
Although Burke would disclaim any sort of procedure or rationalistic
system for creating something that is necessarily organic, he describes
some of its sources.239 A constitutional culture requires resort to
“superadded ideas, furnished from the wardrobe of a moral
imagination, which the heart owns and the understanding ratifies as
necessary to cover the defects of our naked, shivering nature, and to
raise it to dignity in our own estimation.”240 Burke coined the phrase
“wardrobe of a moral imagination,”241 and while he does not elaborate
on it, he says enough to give us a sense of what he means. In his
Philosophical Enquiry, Burke defines the imagination as “a sort of
creative power . . . either in representing at pleasure the images of
things in the order and manner in which they were received by the
senses, or in combining those images in a new manner, and according
to a different order.”242 The imagination acts as both receiver and
creator: it stores information taken in by the senses and conjures old
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242

AQUINAS, supra note 44, at II-II Q. 101 art. 1.
BURKE, supra note 20, at 66.
Id. at 67.
Id.
Id.
See WRIGHT, supra note 182, at 131–33; BOURKE, supra note 172, at 678.
BURKE, supra note 20, at 67.
See WRIGHT, supra note 182, at 133–36.
BURKE, supra note 20, at 67.
WRIGHT, supra note 182, at 129; BYRNE, supra note 171, at 7.
BURKE, supra note 209, at 18.
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and new images that can trigger powerful emotions. Burke’s use of the
word “moral” to modify “imagination” makes sense in this context
because he is discussing how we are to act socially and politically, which
are moral questions. Thus, for Burke the moral imagination has a
relationship with constitutional culture that flows in both directions:
the wardrobe of the moral imagination shapes our emotions and
produces our constitutional culture, and our constitutional culture
stocks the wardrobe with items that shape our emotions.243
What are those items? Burke contrasts the healthy culture created
by the wardrobe of a moral imagination with the notion that “a king is
but a man, a queen is but a woman; a woman is but an animal, and an
animal not of the highest order.”244 A moral imagination, then, is what
elevates a woman so that she is not just a woman but a queen, with the
complex mixture of ideas and “awe”245 that that office evokes. The
crown, orb, and scepter of the monarch; the miter, robes, and crosier
of the bishop; the helmet, armor, and sword of the knight: these are
the “pleasing illusions” taken from the “wardrobe of a moral
imagination” to “cover the defects of our naked, shivering nature.”246
It would be a mistake, however, to take the metaphor of a
“wardrobe” literally; Burke is not referring exclusively to the garb of
political power. He praises the constitutional culture of the British
because they “[a]lways act[] as if in the presence of canonized
forefathers.”247 Their constitutional culture “has its bearings and its
ensigns armorial. It has its gallery of portraits, its monumental inscriptions, its records, evidences, and titles.”248 One is reminded of John
Adams’s insistence on the importance of titles in generating the
necessary respect for governmental officers.249 In short, the wardrobe
of a moral imagination consists of the symbols, images, rituals, and
customs that inspire the mixture of ideas and emotions (e.g., love of
constitution, respect of rulers) that form our constitutional culture.
C. The Risks of Radicalism
Burke assails the French revolutionaries for having disregarded
the importance of such a culture. They “chose to act as if [they] had
never been molded into civil society and had everything to begin

243
244
245
246
247
248
249

WRIGHT, supra note 182, at 133–36.
BURKE, supra note 20, at 67.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 30.
Id.
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anew.”250 Burke’s use of “molded” says a lot, since it occurs immediately after he had described the ways in which British constitutional
culture molded the British national character. Burke is accusing the
revolutionaries of destroying their own character: “You began ill, because
you began by despising everything that belonged to you.”251
Burke sees this as dangerous and destabilizing.252 By tearing down
their constitutional culture and replacing it only with their abstract
political theories, the revolutionaries would leave themselves without
the emotional attachments necessary to sustain a constitution: “Nothing
is left which engages the affections on the part of the commonwealth.
On the principles of this mechanic philosophy, our institutions can
never be embodied, if I may use the expression, in persons, so as to
create in us love, veneration, admiration, or attachment.” 253 The
resulting regime would be precarious because rational arguments, by
themselves, are insufficient to generate popular allegiance to a
constitution over time; obedience to the law requires a disposition or
character composed, in part, by the emotions formed through
constitutional culture.254 “But that sort of reason which banishes the
affections is incapable of filling their place. These public affections,
combined with manners, are required sometimes as supplements,
sometimes as correctives, always as aids to law.”255 Burke draws the
conclusion that, because the revolutionaries would not be able to rely
on a constitutional culture supporting their theories, their regime
would ultimately have to rely on fear and violence: “In the groves of
their academy, at the end of every vista, you see nothing but the
gallows.”256
Here we again see the insights of Aquinas and Burke coming
together. Aquinas insisted that our emotions had to be in line with our
reason and will to create a stable character oriented toward virtue.
Burke extrapolated from a similar understanding of human nature to
argue that a society needs prejudices—the union of reason, emotion,
and the will—to form a stable national character oriented toward
obedience to the constitution, and the emotional component of these
good prejudices is created by a constitutional culture drawing from a

250
251
252
253

BURKE, supra note 20, at 31.
Id.
BYRNE, supra note 171, at 24–26.
BURKE, supra note 20, at 68; see also GEORGE SANTAYANA, INTERPRETATIONS OF
POETRY AND RELIGION 9 (1922).
254 WRIGHT, supra note 182, at 127–28; see also BOURKE, supra note 172, at 704–06;
LEVIN, supra note 182, at 57–64; JESSE NORMAN, EDMUND BURKE: THE FIRST CONSERVATIVE
28–29 (2013).
255 BURKE, supra note 20, at 68.
256 Id.; see also BYRNE, supra note 171, at 35–39; LEVIN, supra note 182, at 57–64.
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well-stocked wardrobe of a moral imagination. Just as Aquinas saw that
a person’s orientation toward virtue would be unstable as long as their
emotions were at war with their reason, Burke saw that a nation’s
orientation toward constitutional obedience would be unstable as long
as its constitutional culture was at war with its constitutional philosophy, a point supported by the modern science of emotion.257 “[I]f
reason attempts to rule the passions [despotically] . . . , the passions
will erupt in rebellion.”258
Burke’s insight into the essential role of emotion in the formation
of a stable national character oriented toward constitutional
obedience is ultimately rooted in an account of human nature
consistent with the account offered by Aquinas. Understanding the
relationship between reason, emotion, and the will within the
individual human person helps us understand the same relationship
within constitutional culture.
III.

EMOTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

Having examined the role of emotion within the individual and
integrated it into our understanding of constitutional culture, we are
now in a position to assess the role of emotion in constitutional theory.
And when we do so, it becomes clear that emotion has its most
important application to theories of constitutional legitimacy: theories
that seek to explain why we are morally obligated to obey the
Constitution and the laws enacted under it, though I will also touch
upon some of the implications for constitutional doctrine (and stare
decisis, in particular) toward the end.259 I do not claim that what I
argue in this Part exhausts the implications of emotion for
constitutional theory; there may very well be other implications.260 But
the synthesized account of the Thomistic and Burkean understanding
of emotion is most relevant to assessing theories of constitutional
legitimacy.
Based on that account, I will argue that American constitutional
theorists have been overlooking the essential role of emotion in
evaluating theories of constitutional legitimacy. Reason alone is not
257 Gewirtzman, supra note 6, at 657–70.
258 LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 100. Solum, relying on Richard Kraut’s work on
Aristotle, has made a related argument about the importance of emotional attachments to
the stability of a regime in his discussion of justice-as-lawfulness, with lawfulness depending
on adherence to laws, norms, and customs generally accepted by a community. See Solum,
supra note 16, at 89–91; Solum, supra note 6, at 516–18.
259 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 20–46
(2018) (distinguishing between moral, sociological, and legal legitimacy).
260 See, e.g., Gewirtzman, supra note 6, at 677–83; Greene, supra note 3, at 1446–69. See
generally Solum, supra note 6.
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sufficient to sustain obedience to the Constitution; emotional
attachments to the Constitution are essential. This fact has normative
consequences insofar as the stability of the Constitution is considered
a good thing,261 and as Burke argued, that stability is a good thing
insofar as it helps avoid the political, economic, and social breakdown
that can accompany the overthrow of a society’s constitution.262
Consequently, theories of legitimacy that accord with the emotional
attachments woven into our constitutional culture have a strong
argument in their favor. By contrast, those theories of legitimacy that
are contrary to our constitutional culture should be abandoned or
modified or, alternatively, they must explain how our constitutional
culture could conform to the theory without destabilizing the
Constitution or why such destabilization is justified.
But just as reason is insufficient to sustain a constitution, so, too,
is emotion, and one limitation of my argument is that I will focus only
on the role of emotion in assessing theories of legitimacy. I will not
assess which theory of legitimacy best accords with reason. Thus, while
I argue that some theories of legitimacy have a stronger case in their
favor because they accord with our constitutional culture, I leave open
the possibility that such theories may nonetheless be wrong as a logical
matter, which would be a strong reason to reject them and, if necessary,
seek to change our constitutional culture to suit a more logically sound
theory. To do otherwise would be to habituate ourselves to error, which
would entail the formation of bad habits.263 I address some of the
problems that confront efforts to change constitutional culture in
subsection III.B.3.
I will begin by describing the role that theories of legitimacy play
in constitutional theory and in the formation of constitutional culture.
A. Theories of Constitutional Legitimacy and the Importance of
Constitutional Culture
Complete constitutional theories have two components: a
methodology and a justification. By a “methodology,” I mean a form
of analysis (one might call it a decision procedure) governing how to
adjudicate constitutional disputes, and by a “justification,” I mean the
reasons why a particular methodology should be adopted.264 For

261 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 140–44 (1996); Solum, supra note 16, at
94–95; Solum, supra note 6, at 516–18.
262 See supra Section II.C.
263 See AQUINAS, supra note 44, at I-II Q. 75 art. 4; see also CESSARIO, supra note 148, at
38–42, 53–54.
264 FALLON, supra note 259, at 132–33; RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A
THEORY OF PRECEDENT 64 (2017); Andrew Coan, The Foundations of Constitutional Theory,
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example, John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport’s originalist
constitutional theory offers a methodology: “interpret the
Constitution using the same interpretive methods that the enactors
would have used.”265 It also offers a justification: because the
Constitution (with its amendments) was enacted through supermajoritarian voting procedures, and because supermajoritarian voting
procedures “are the most desirable way of creating good constitutional
provisions,” the Constitution should be interpreted to preserve the
meaning agreed upon by the supermajority.266
Justifications ultimately rest on normative arguments. While some
theorists argue that a particular methodology is—as a factual matter—
the correct way to interpret the U.S. Constitution,267 such an argument
cannot explain why we should care about that fact (assuming that it is
a fact).268 We could, after all, decide to ignore the Constitution
(however interpreted) in resolving disputes about governmental
power. A complete constitutional theory must therefore explain why
the Constitution is legitimate: why we should adhere to the
Constitution.269 A theory of constitutional legitimacy also helps determine the appropriate methodology. Knowing why the Constitution is
legitimate helps us understand how to adjudicate disputes about its
content and application.270 If, for instance, a theorist believes that the
Constitution is legitimate only insofar as judges can adapt its meaning
to reflect the views of those living today,271 that theorist will need to
reject methodologies that impose significant constraints on judicial
2017 WIS. L. REV. 833, 836. But see Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism: Standard and Procedure,
135 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3812715 [https://
perma.cc/GKK2-77PV] (arguing that originalism should not be understood as a decision
procedure).
265 JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD
CONSTITUTION 14 (2013).
266 Id. at 11–12.
267 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823,
1825–33 (1997); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own
Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 858–64 (2009); Saikrishna B. Prakash, The
Misunderstood Relationship Between Originalism and Popular Sovereignty, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 485, 486–89 (2008).
268 Fallon, supra note 58, at 545–49; see also Lawson, supra note 267, at 1823–25, 1835–
36 (acknowledging this point); Paulsen, supra note 267, at 919 (same); Prakash, supra note
267, at 489–91 (same).
269 See FALLON, supra note 259, at 1–14; KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 110–11
(1999); Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1127, 1130 (1998).
270 See DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 190–92; FALLON, supra note 259, at 125–54;
WHITTINGTON, supra note 269, at 111; McConnell, supra note 269, at 1130; see also ERNEST
A. YOUNG, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 57–68 (2017).
271 See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 175, at 59–99.
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discretion,272 which means the theorist might instead adopt a
methodology that interprets the language of the Constitution at a fairly
high level of generality.273
For these reasons, it is common for constitutional theorists—
originalists and non-originalists alike—to offer a theory of
constitutional legitimacy as part of their justification for their
methodology.274 Various theories of legitimacy have been offered.
Originalists have often relied on popular sovereignty,275 but other
originalists have grounded the Constitution’s legitimacy in its ability to
protect natural rights,276 to produce good consequences,277 or to
accord with the natural law.278 Non-originalists have argued that the
Constitution is legitimate because it meets the minimum standards of
justice and democracy,279 it provides common ground for settling
otherwise difficult and controversial questions,280 or it accepts integrity
as a central principle of our political system.281 All of these theorists
see constitutional legitimacy as a logical premise in a larger argument
in favor of their particular methodology.
But the foregoing discussion of the role of emotion in
constitutional culture should cause us to focus on a different purpose
served by theories of legitimacy. Aquinas and Burke show us that
obedience to a constitution must become part of a society’s habitus—
part of its national character—if the regime is to endure. Good
arguments alone will not support a constitution; they must be joined
with affection for the constitution and the will to sustain it.282 There
must, in other words, be a prejudice in favor of a society’s constitution,
which is the product of a particular constitutional culture.283 As James
Madison recognized in Federalist 49, “veneration” for governing

272 See id. at 24, 59–73.
273 Id. at 21–35; see also Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism:
The Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1243, 1282–83 (2019); Nelson
Lund, Living Originalism: The Magical Mystery Tour, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 31, 32–36 (2015).
274 See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 175, at 59–99; RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 1–86 (2004); DWORKIN, supra note 11, at
176–224; FALLON, supra note 259, at 20–46; WHITTINGTON, supra note 269, at 110–59.
275 See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93
VA. L. REV. 1437, 1440 (2007); WHITTINGTON, supra note 269, at 110–59.
276 See BARNETT, supra note 274, at 1–86.
277 See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 265, at 33–80.
278 See LEE J. STRANG, ORIGINALISM’S PROMISE 221–309 (2019); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski &
Kevin C. Walsh, Enduring Originalism, 105 GEO. L.J. 97, 117–38 (2016).
279 See FALLON, supra note 259, at 29–35.
280 See STRAUSS, supra note 11, at 99–114.
281 See DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 176–224.
282 See supra Part II.
283 See id.
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institutions is something “without which perhaps the wisest and freest
governments would not possess the requisite stability.”284
And as Burke argued, theories of constitutional legitimacy play a
key role in the cultivation of the sentiments and ideas that can sustain
a regime. When Dr. Richard Price—the target of Burke’s arguments
in Reflections—asserted that the British constitution was founded on the
right of the people “to choose [their] own governors,”285 Burke did
not just argue that this theory of legitimacy was wrong as a historical or
legal matter; he argued that it did not fit with Britain’s constitutional
culture: “The body of the people of England have no share in it. They
utterly disclaim it.”286 Burke asserted that the theory of legitimacy
undergirding the British constitution was a theory of hereditary
succession, and while he carefully reviewed the relevant historical and
legal underpinnings of the hereditary theory,287 he was emphatic that
hereditary succession was the theory bound up with the British
people’s affections. It is worth repeating his words on this point:
In this choice of inheritance we have given to our frame of polity
the image of a relation in blood, binding up the constitution of our
country with our dearest domestic ties, adopting our fundamental
laws into the bosom of our family affections, keeping inseparable
and cherishing with the warmth of all their combined and mutually
reflected charities our state, our hearths, our sepulchres, and our
altars.288

Immediately following this passage, he states that the British people
had “call[ed] in the aid of [nature’s] unerring and powerful instincts
to fortify the fallible and feeble contrivances of our reason.”289 In that
same paragraph, he describes the numerous cultural artifacts of what
he would later in Reflections call “the wardrobe of a moral
imagination”290 that have preserved the British constitution by
appealing to the people’s “nature rather than [their] speculations.”291
Burke shows us that a theory of constitutional legitimacy is not just a
logical premise in a complete constitutional theory; it is the basis for a
constitutional culture that, when successful, produces “those inbred
sentiments which are the faithful guardians, the active monitors of” a

284 THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 314 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
285 BURKE, supra note 20, at 14 (quoting RICHARD PRICE, A DISCOURSE ON THE LOVE
OF OUR COUNTRY 34 (London, George Stafford 2d ed. 1789)).
286 Id.
287 See id. at 14–29.
288 Id. at 30.
289 Id.
290 Id. at 30, 67.
291 Id. at 30–31.
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constitution.292 Stripping away that culture and replacing it with an
alien theory of legitimacy—as Burke thought the French revolutionaries did—is thus inherently destabilizing and potentially dangerous.293
It is analogous to reason attempting to rule the passions despotically:
“the passions will erupt in rebellion.”294
Yet, constitutional theorists rarely ask whether a theory of
legitimacy is consistent with American constitutional culture.295 That
is, they rarely ask whether the American people’s “inbred
sentiments”296 favor a particular conception of the Constitution, and if
so, what role that should play in thinking about the basis for the
Constitution’s legitimacy. Instead, the debates over constitutional
legitimacy occur almost exclusively in abstract philosophical terms—
precisely the error that Burke identified in Price’s argument.297 If
Burke’s model of constitutional culture—as synthesized with Aquinas’s
model of emotions—is sound, then American constitutional theorists
have been overlooking a fundamental consideration in their debates
over constitutional legitimacy: Which theory of legitimacy is most
consonant with the ideas and sentiments of American constitutional
culture?
That is not to say that constitutional theorists have ignored
American constitutional culture in formulating their theories. Bruce
Ackerman, for instance, has come closest to asking the type of question
I am asking here. His project is motivated by a similar concern about
the disconnect between constitutional theory and constitutional
culture,298 which leads him to develop a rich and nuanced description
of our constitutional culture as the basis for his particular methodology.299 But while Ackerman often refers to the emotions involved in
constitutional politics, his account is almost entirely focused on
intellectual history,300 not on the role that emotion plays in sustaining
a constitution. This causes him to miss the potential normative
implications of attempting to impose a theory of legitimacy alien to our
292 Id. at 75; see also Jason Mazzone, The Creation of a Constitutional Culture, 40 TULSA L.
REV. 671, 688–95 (2005) (making a similar point).
293 See supra Section II.C.
294 LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 100.
295 Gewirtzman, supra note 6, at 625; see id. at 629–32.
296 BURKE, supra note 20, at 75.
297 Gewirtzman, supra note 6, at 631 (“[T]he definition of constitutional commitments
is still commonly seen as a process dominated by rationality . . . .”).
298 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 3–5, 56–57 (1991).
299 See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014); 2
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); 1 ACKERMAN, supra note
298.
300 See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 298, at 165–99 (reconstructing the arguments of The
Federalist Papers).
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constitutional culture,301 which perhaps explains why Ackerman never
developed a robust normative argument in favor of his theory of
legitimacy.302 Other rich accounts of our constitutional culture likewise overlook the significance of emotional attachments for theories
of legitimacy.303
Nor am I arguing that jurists have ignored constitutional culture
in their opinions. As Greene has shown, the Justices routinely appeal
to emotions embedded in our constitutional culture.304 When Justice
Scalia, in his opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,305 “compare[s] the
visage of Roger Taney, a villain within the American constitutional
narrative,” with the majority opinion’s authors, “[h]e knows that
showing rather than telling us that abortion is like slavery and that Roe
is like Dred Scott enlivens the moral message and makes his opponent’s
position feel not just wrong but shameful.”306 Indeed, although the
Court has never used the phrase “wardrobe of a moral imagination,”307
it has recognized the ways in which rituals, customs, garments, symbols,
and images play a role in shaping America’s constitutional culture by
“calling in the aid of [nature’s] unerring and powerful instincts to
fortify the fallible and feeble contrivances of our reason.”308 It did so
perhaps most famously in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, where, in a Burkean turn of phrase, Justice Jackson’s majority
opinion described a national flag as a symbol that acts as “a short cut
from mind to mind.”309 And it did so recently in American Legion v.
American Humanist Ass’n, where Justice Alito’s majority opinion
described how, “[w]ith sufficient time, religiously expressive
monuments, symbols, and practices can become embedded features of
a community’s landscape and identity.”310

301 See infra subsection III.B.3.
302 See BARNETT, supra note 274, at 14 n.17; James E. Fleming, We the Unconventional
American People, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1530–31 (1998) (book review). That is not to say
that Ackerman fails to make a normative argument, only that it is thin. See 1 ACKERMAN,
supra note 298, at 295–322.
303 See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 175, at 277–300. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR,
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2006); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO
CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004).
304 Greene, supra note 3, at 1419–46.
305 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
306 Greene, supra note 3, at 1420.
307 BURKE, supra note 20, at 67.
308 Id. at 30.
309 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943).
310 Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2084 (2019).
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But my focus here is not on the role of emotion in judging, a
separate topic explored by other scholars.311 For my own part, I
believe, consistent with Aquinas and Burke, that while a virtuous judge
would experience emotions that align with the legally proper outcome
in a case,312 the ultimate source of judgment in a case (as in the
individual) should be reason, not her own emotions or the emotions
of the litigants. While it makes sense that Justice Scalia—given his legal
views on the question at issue in Casey—experienced a strong
emotional response against the majority opinion,313 his vote in that
case should have been ultimately guided by what he understood to be
required by reason,314 and I have no doubt that it was.
My point, rather, is that there is a disconnect between the
conversation occurring within constitutional theory (in which scholars
offer all manner of abstract theories of constitutional legitimacy of
their own invention) and the reality of our constitutional culture (in
which the American people are disposed, by both reason and emotion,
toward a particular conception of constitutional legitimacy).
Constitutional theorists are, in effect, repeating the mistake that Burke
highlighted in Reflections: ignoring the role of affections in binding a
people to their constitution and assuming that a theory of constitutional legitimacy can be sustained through argument alone.
When we pose the question of which theory of constitutional
legitimacy is most consistent with our constitutional culture, there is
little room for doubt as to what that theory is: popular sovereignty. The
Declaration of Independence asserts that governments “deriv[e] their
just powers from the consent of the governed.”315 The Constitution
itself declares its legitimacy on the basis of popular sovereignty in its
opening words: “We the People of the United States.”316 The Vesting
Clauses describe the powers granted to the Federal Government by the
people,317 and the Ninth318 and Tenth Amendments319 confirm that the
rights and powers described in the Constitution and its amendments
are ultimately held by the people. The pervasive political theory at the
Founding was that “the people of the United States” were “America’s
311 See, e.g., Greene, supra note 3, at 1446–66; Maroney, supra note 1, at 652–73; Martha
C. Nussbaum, Emotion in the Language of Judging, 70 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 23 (1996).
312 See Solum, supra note 37.
313 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 998 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
314 On this point, I differ with many law-and-emotion theorists. See, e.g., Gewirtzman,
supra note 6, at 657–63; Nussbaum, supra note 311, at 30.
315 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
316 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
317 Id. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1; id. art. III, § 1.
318 Id. amend. IX.
319 Id. amend. X.
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supreme lawgiver,”320 which is why “the ratifying conventions that met
between 1787 and 1790 operated under special voting and eligibility
rules, allowing a wider swath of Americans to vote and serve” compared
with the rules for voting or serving in a state legislature.321
As numerous constitutional theorists have recognized, popular
sovereignty remains the theory of legitimacy endorsed by our
constitutional culture today.322 Presidents323 and the Supreme Court324
routinely invoke popular sovereignty. Some of the most powerful and
hallowed artifacts of our constitutional culture—the American
“wardrobe of a moral imagination”325—elicit emotional responses
from us by their appeal to the notion of We the People. Aside from
our founding documents, perhaps none is equal to Lincoln’s
Gettysburg Address, with its concluding resolution that “government
of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the
earth.”326 Popular sovereignty is the theory of legitimacy that engages
and shapes our affections toward the Constitution.
Or is that too simplistic? Might there be multiple constitutional
cultures, such as one constitutional culture regarding social issues like
abortion and another surrounding separation-of-powers issues like the
scope of the administrative state? Or maybe there is a single

320 AMAR, supra note 303, at 285; see also RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN
CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE 62–81 (2016);
EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 263–87 (1989); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 372–89 (1998); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1429–51 (1987); Christian G. Fritz, Alternative Visions of
American Constitutionalism: Popular Sovereignty and the Early American Constitutional Debate, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 287, 290–98 (1997).
321 AMAR, supra note 303, at 308.
322 See BALKIN, supra note 175, at 64; BARNETT, supra note 320, at 18–26; Baude, supra
note 58, at 2407; Paul W. Kahn, Freedom, Autonomy, and the Cultural Study of Law, 13 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 141, 156–57 (2001); Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Standing in the Shadow of
Popular Sovereignty, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1869, 1877 (2015); Saikrishna B. Prakash, Overcoming the
Constitution, 91 GEO L.J. 407, 436 (2003) (reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON, IMPLEMENTING
THE CONSTITUTION (2001)).
323 See, e.g., Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 2013) (transcript available at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/21/inaugural-addresspresident-barack-obama [https://perma.cc/95B8-2VQV]); Ronald Reagan, Farewell
Address to American People (Jan. 12, 1989) (transcript available at https://www.nytimes
.com/1989/01/12/news/transcript-of-reagan-s-farewell-address-to-american-people.html
[https://perma.cc/VM92-NUW4]).
324 Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1968–69 (2019); see Ariz. State Legislature
v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 819–21 (2015).
325 BURKE, supra note 20, at 67.
326 Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863) (transcript available at
https://rmc.library.cornell.edu/gettysburg/good_cause/transcript.htm [https://perma
.cc/2J6P-YY44]).
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constitutional culture, but it is the result of an overlapping consensus327
of different theories of legitimacy rather than a single legitimacy
theory.
There is truth in each of these objections. It is implausible to say
that all Americans hold to the same theory of legitimacy, so it is true
that the legitimacy of the Constitution is sustained through some form
of overlapping consensus among divergent theories of legitimacy. And
I do not doubt that, for some people, their theory of legitimacy might
change in subtle ways depending on its implications for a given
substantive issue. But none of these qualifications—important though
they are—meaningfully detract from the conclusion that popular
sovereignty is the dominant theory of legitimacy in our constitutional
culture.
Of course, as discussed in Part III.B.1, there are different theories
of popular sovereignty that might be embraced by our constitutional
culture to varying degrees, and one might wonder whether that
undermines the argument that theories of legitimacy must account for
our constitutional culture, since it is unclear which popular-sovereignty
theory our culture embraces. But the people are not political theorists;
they do not—and need not—have a fine-grained understanding of the
various conceptions of popular sovereignty. What matters is that any
constitutional theory that justifies itself in the language of popular
sovereignty—broadly conceived—will better accord with our
constitutional culture than one that does not.
Yet, it has become common in constitutional theory to dismiss
popular sovereignty. Scholars argue that for the people to have
genuinely consented to the Constitution, the consent must have been
unanimous, which it plainly was not.328 Others object to the notion of
“the people” as a continuous body stretching backward to the
Founding and forward in time.329 Constitutional theorists have not
offered their own theories of constitutional legitimacy because they are
unaware of the popular-sovereignty theory; they have done so because
they, like Dr. Price, have rejected the theory of legitimacy embraced by
our constitutional culture.
B. Evaluating Theories of Constitutional Legitimacy
In light of the synthesized Thomistic and Burkean account of
constitutional culture, if we accept that popular sovereignty is the
theory of legitimacy endorsed by our constitutional culture, then
constitutional theorists cannot so easily dismiss popular sovereignty,
327
328
329

See RAWLS, supra note 261, at 133–72.
See, e.g., FALLON, supra note 259, at 24–35; DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 192–93.
See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 175, at 1722–24.
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since it plays a major role in cultivating the “inbred sentiments”330 that
sustain obedience to the Constitution. That leaves us with three
choices in evaluating theories of constitutional legitimacy. First, we
can show that a theory is consistent with the notion of popular
sovereignty enmeshed in our constitutional culture, in which case no
modifications to the theory are necessary (at least, not based on what I
have said here). Second, we can acknowledge that a theory is contrary
to our constitutional culture and modify or abandon the theory as a
result. Third, we can take a more radical course: acknowledge that a
theory is contrary to our constitutional culture but try to conform the
culture to the theory. The implications of emotion for constitutional
theory are most evident in the second and third options, so I will begin
by quickly moving through the first.
1. Constitutional Theories Consistent with Popular Sovereignty
If a constitutional theory is consistent with popular sovereignty,
nothing I have said would require any changes to it. Rather, the main
implication would be that these theories have a stronger argument in
their favor, since they are consistent with the constitutional culture
that sustains obedience to our Constitution.
To know whether constitutional theories are consistent with
popular sovereignty, we need to know what “popular sovereignty”
means. Popular sovereignty is a complicated concept,331 and there are
surely many theories of popular sovereignty that we might consider as
possibilities, but there are two main types of popular sovereignty
theories found in the constitutional theory literature. The first, dualist
conception is represented by Keith Whittington, and it draws a clear
line between the people acting in their sovereign capacity and the
people acting in ordinary politics. The people acted in their sovereign
capacity by ratifying the Constitution, and they continue to do so
whenever they amend it.332 At all other times, the popular sovereign is
dormant, but it retains the potential to reassert sovereignty through
the amendment process.333 Ordinary politics, under this view, is not a
manifestation of popular sovereignty.334 Indeed, it is essential that
ordinary politics not be seen as an act of the sovereign, since it would
undermine the basis for judicial review by making statutes (a product

330
331
332
333
334

BURKE, supra note 20, at 75.
See MORGAN, supra note 320.
See WHITTINGTON, supra note 269, at 135–36.
See id.
Id. at 136.
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of ordinary politics) equal in authority to the Constitution.335 This view
is most consistent with an originalist methodology.336
The other type of popular sovereignty theory, represented by
Balkin, does not draw a clean line between ordinary politics and the
people acting as sovereign.337 It argues that, while “the initial authority
of the text comes from the fact that it was created through successive
acts of popular sovereignty,”338 the people can only truly be sovereign
if the Constitution continues to reflect their changing views as
expressed through the process of democratic politics.339 Political and
social movements—as manifestations of the popular sovereign—can
use ordinary politics to influence constitutional meaning in various
ways, including through selecting judges who embody the people’s
understanding of the Constitution on particular issues.340 This view is
most consistent with a non-originalist methodology.341
Ackerman’s conception of popular sovereignty might be seen as
residing between these two positions, since he both insists on dualism
while allowing for the people to act as sovereign through ordinary politics under extraordinary conditions.342 For reasons that Whittington
and others have explained, I believe Ackerman’s view ultimately
collapses into the view associated with Balkin,343 and it is telling that
Balkin sees a good deal of overlap between his view and Ackerman’s.344
While I am sympathetic to Baude’s suggestion that a Whittingtontype theory of popular sovereignty has more support in our
constitutional culture,345 resolving that question would require a much
more extensive discussion that is beyond the scope of this Article. I

335
336
337

Id. at 136–42, 153. For Whittington’s complete argument, see id. at 110–59.
Id. at 152–59; see also Baude, supra note 58, at 2366.
This is similar to what Ackerman describes as the “monist” position. See 1
ACKERMAN, supra note 298, at 7–10.
338 BALKIN, supra note 175, at 55.
339 Id. at 55, 59–73.
340 Id. at 277–79.
341 Id. (explaining the continual change in constitutional meaning as a form of living
constitutionalism). Balkin is a self-described originalist, and I do not intend to take issue
with that label here. My only point—with which Balkin agrees—is that the component of
his popular sovereignty theory that envisions continual constitutional change through
ordinary politics is a form of living constitutionalism, not originalism.
342 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 298, at 6–7, 266–94.
343 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 269, at 241 n.48, 274 nn.92 & 98 & 275 n.100; see also
Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 115, 120–
22 (1994); Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce
Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759, 763–75 (1992) (book
review); Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REV. 918, 928–34 (1992)
(reviewing 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 298).
344 BALKIN, supra note 175, at 309–12.
345 Baude, supra note 58, at 2366.
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will assume, therefore, a fairly broad understanding of popular
sovereignty for purposes of this Article, which would not rule out either
the Whittington or the Balkin conception. For reasons I have
explained elsewhere, I find Whittington’s conception of popular
sovereignty far more coherent and consistent with the design of our
Constitution,346 which is one reason I am an originalist, but that is an
argument about the comparative theoretical merits of the two
conceptions of popular sovereignty, not an argument about its
consistency with American constitutional culture.
The key point, then, is that insofar as some version of popular
sovereignty accepted by our constitutional culture is logically sound, it
is a strong basis upon which to build a constitutional theory, since it
would align with both reason and emotion. It would have the ingredients for a prejudice that would form the national character of the
American people in support of the Constitution.
2. Constitutional Theories That Might Change
For those theories that reject or are inconsistent with popular
sovereignty, the foregoing analysis forces us to ask whether they should
be modified or abandoned to accommodate our constitutional
culture. Theorists who reject popular sovereignty do so because they
believe it is a logically flawed understanding of legitimacy,347 so the
notion of nonetheless changing their theories to integrate popular
sovereignty would likely rest on the premise that the logical soundness
of a theory of legitimacy is less important than its ability to accord with
our constitutional culture.
There are various reasons why a theorist might believe that the
logical soundness of a theory of legitimacy is less important than its
ability to accord with our constitutional culture. One would be that we
value social and political stability more than truth, so we should accept
a theory of legitimacy endorsed by our constitutional culture even if
we know it be irrational, since a legitimacy theory is crucial to the
stability of a regime. I reject that view, since it would be asking theorists
to take part in a Noble Lie,348 which is not a permissible approach for

346 See Joel Alicea, Originalism and the Rule of the Dead, NAT’L AFFS. (Spring 2015),
https://nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/originalism-and-the-rule-of-the-dead
[https://perma.cc/R5DU-YU5W]; Joel Alicea, Real Judicial Restraint, NAT’L AFFS. (Fall
2013),
https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/real-judicial-restraint
[https://perma.cc/DN56-WYFF].
347 See supra notes 328–29.
348 PLATO, The Republic, in PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS 414b–c (John M. Cooper ed.,
G.M.A. Grube & C.D.C. Reeve trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1997) (c. 380 B.C.E.).
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anyone who believes that lying is always immoral349 or that scholars
have a special obligation to pursue the truth.350
Alternatively, a theorist might think that any viable constitutional
theory must be able to explain our current constitutional practices.
Many constitutional theorists have some version of this view.351 For
example, both Fallon (a non-originalist) and Baude and Sachs
(originalists) argue that constitutional theory should be able to explain
what our current law is, and since they accept a form of legal positivism
that identifies the law by reference to social or legal practices, they
believe that a constitutional theory must accord with our social or legal
practices.352 Understanding the role that theories of legitimacy play in
fostering the ideas and emotions that sustain a constitution raises the
question of whether those theories should be seen as one of the
practices that identify what the positive law is, which would commit
legal positivists to incorporating popular sovereignty into their
constitutional theories (assuming that they agree, as a factual matter,
that our constitutional culture endorses popular sovereignty).
Baude has suggested this very possibility,353 and the account of
emotion and constitutional culture outlined above lends added weight
to it. That might lead to an interesting dilemma for some positivists.
Fallon, for instance, appears to reject popular sovereignty—at least in
any strong form—because he believes it is false,354 but if it is a practice
that identifies the positive law, the moral truth or falsity of the practice
should be beside the point under his view.355 Fallon would likely
respond that this confuses two distinct questions: (1) what the law is (a
positivist, descriptive question), and (2) why we should obey the law (a
normative, moral question),356 with theories of legitimacy only being
relevant to the latter question. But that might be too simple, since—

349 See CHRISTOPHER O. TOLLEFSEN, LYING AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS (2014); AUGUSTINE,
TO CONSENTIUS, AGAINST LYING (c. 420), reprinted in 3 NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS,
FIRST SERIES (Philip Schaff ed., H. Browne trans., Buffalo, Christian Literature Publ’g Co.
1887), https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1313.htm [https://perma.cc/X9RA-ZBDV];
AUGUSTINE, ON LYING (c. 395), in 3 NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS, FIRST SERIES, supra,
https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1312.htm [https://perma.cc/8MHC-2E6J].
350 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, SPEAK FREELY: WHY UNIVERSITIES MUST DEFEND FREE
SPEECH 9–27 (2018).
351 Fallon, supra note 58, at 554–57 (surveying practice-based theories).
352 FALLON, supra note 259, at 85–92; Baude, supra note 58, at 2363–72; Stephen E.
Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 817, 822–38 (2015).
353 Baude, supra note 58, at 2365–67.
354 FALLON, supra note 259, at 24–35, 83–85. I say “appears” because it is not entirely
clear to me that Fallon would reject the type of popular sovereignty theory I attribute to
Balkin.
355 Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 278, at 114–16.
356 Id. (distinguishing these two questions).

1196

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:3

as Fallon himself argues persuasively—theories of legitimacy significantly influence the choice of constitutional methodology,357 which in
turn affects the determination of what the law is (e.g., popular
sovereignty might lead to originalism, which might lead to rejection of
at least some non-originalist precedent as part of our law).358 That is
to say, the rule of recognition—which is rooted in precisely the kinds
of social practices integral to Burke’s account of constitutional
culture—might incorporate a theory of legitimacy,359 or, as Baude
frames the point, it may be that “our current legal practice is to treat
the dead as if they had legal authority.”360 In any event, at the very
least, understanding the role that theories of legitimacy play in our
constitutional culture and in the logical structure of constitutional
theories provides a new reason for asking whether the usual clean,
positivist division between what the law is and why we should obey it is
sustainable.
That dilemma might be exported, in modified form, to other,
nonpositivist, practice-based theories as well. Dworkin’s “moral
reading”361 methodology, for instance, asserts that “propositions of law
are true if they figure in or follow from the principles of justice,
fairness, and procedural due process that provide the best constructive
interpretation of the community’s legal practice.”362 Dworkin argues
that this methodology follows from his theory of legitimacy,363 which
posits that a regime is morally legitimate insofar as it embraces the
principle of integrity (i.e., the principle “that the law be seen as
[morally] coherent . . . so far as possible”).364 Dworkin defends an
unusual conception of popular sovereignty,365 and as Ackerman has
argued, there is good reason for believing that it does not accord with
American constitutional culture.366 What if a non-Dworkinian conception of popular sovereignty, in the context of American society, is
essential to making the law morally coherent, since it would otherwise

357 See FALLON, supra note 259, at 125–54.
358 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5
AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 5–8 (2007); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting
Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 289–98 (2005). But see Baude, supra note
58, at 2356–61 (adopting an expansive understanding of originalism that accepts many nonoriginalist precedents as law).
359 See Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 278, at 110–12; FINNIS, supra note 62, at 3–19.
360 Baude, supra note 58, at 2366.
361 RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 1–38 (1996).
362 DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 225.
363 Id. at 176, 190–92.
364 Id. at 176, 186–224.
365 Id. at 192–93; DWORKIN, supra note 361, at 1–38.
366 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 298, at 10–16.
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be impossible to explain features of our constitutional culture?
Indeed, that is the kind of challenge that James Fleming interprets
Ackerman to have posed to Dworkin,367 but understanding the close
connection between theories of legitimacy, constitutional culture, and
emotion adds force to it. And if that is true, is the American theory of
popular sovereignty reconcilable with the exalted Herculean judge
whom Dworkin would have “bring[] [his own assessment of] political
morality into the heart of constitutional law”?368
As to at least some practice-based constitutional theories, then, it
may very well be that understanding the crucial role of theories of
legitimacy in forming the emotional ties that sustain a constitution
could lead to a reevaluation of the viability (or at least the contours)
of those constitutional theories.369 But having raised that possibility, I
want to bracket its full exploration and move on from theories that
might conform to our constitutional culture to those theories that
adopt a more radical approach.
3. Radical Constitutional Theories
The preceding subsection assumed that the internal logic of some
constitutional theories might cause them to change when confronted
with the importance of popular sovereignty to our constitutional
culture, but other theories have a radically skeptical disposition toward
our constitutional culture and would see no reason to change. This
radicalism can originate from either the political left or the political
right, and it usually manifests itself in hostility to the American
Founding. My point here is not to assess the merits of either of the
schools of thought outlined below, which implicate fraught and
difficult issues. My purpose, rather, is to explore the implications of
the role of emotion in constitutional culture for these theories.
A strain of constitutional theory commonly associated with the
political left would argue that any theory of legitimacy that
presupposes the authority of the Founding generation to adopt the
Constitution is fundamentally, morally illegitimate given the exclusion
of slaves, women, and other groups from the ratification process.370
Some theorists would go even further, asserting that the moral taint of
367 Fleming, supra note 302, at 1530–31.
368 DWORKIN, supra note 361, at 2; DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 239.
369 This argument is analogous to the argument Greene makes with respect to
originalism as a constitutional practice. See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J.
657, 681, 697–702 (2009).
370 LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE 16–17 (2012); Mark
S. Stein, Originalism and Original Exclusions, 98 KY. L.J. 397, 406–20, 448–52 (2009–2010); see
also Thurgood Marshall, The Constitution’s Bicentennial: Commemorating the Wrong Document?,
40 VAND. L. REV. 1337 (1987).
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the Founding calls into question the continuing moral legitimacy of
the Constitution for those excluded groups living today,371 or that at
least some provisions of the Constitution continue to lack moral
legitimacy insofar as that legitimacy is premised on the authority of the
Founders to adopt them.372 The logic of those arguments is hard to
reconcile with the view that it is acceptable for American constitutional
culture to continue believing that the Constitution derives at least part
of its moral legitimacy from its ratification by the sovereign people. If
the Founding was so corrupted by the sins of racism, sexism, and other
forms of discrimination that it could not claim the moral authority to
ratify the Constitution, no theory of popular sovereignty that sees the
Constitution as an intergenerational project rooted in the Founding
can survive, and a constitutional culture whose affections for the
Constitution are based in such a theory must change.
Changing constitutional culture means changing those artifacts
that form the combination of ideas and sentiments from which the
culture is constituted, which means changing a nation’s “wardrobe of
a moral imagination.”373 The greater the change in the culture, the
greater the change in the wardrobe that is necessary. Changing
Americans’ understanding of themselves as a sovereign people who
adopted the Constitution and continue to govern today would, given
that this critique is based on the moral taint of the Founding, require
detaching the sentiments of the people from the Founding.
Burke’s defense of British constitutional culture was written in
opposition to what he perceived as attempts to change it, so we can get
a sense of what that change would entail from Burke’s description of
the things he defended. Affective attachment to the Founding is hard
to disaggregate from affective attachment to the Founders,374 and it is
therefore not surprising that Burke’s intergenerational conception of
a constitutional culture prominently features “canonized forefathers”
and a “gallery of portraits” of “illustrating ancestors.”375 Undoing our
emotional ties to the Founders would therefore entail undermining
the reputations of the Founders themselves, lowering them in the
estimation of the people by emphasizing their vices rather than their
virtues.376 It would mean changing or erasing the “monumental

371 FALLON, supra note 259, at 30–31.
372 Stein, supra note 370, at 440–48.
373 BURKE, supra note 20, at 67.
374 Baude, supra note 58, at 2365–66.
375 BURKE, supra note 20, at 30.
376 See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Opinion, The Monster of Monticello, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30,
2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/opinion/the-real-thomas-jefferson.html
[https://perma.cc/9Q9M-NXQR]. I do not intend to attribute to Finkelman the views of
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inscriptions” that provide physical and public reinforcement of those
affective ties,377 which could be accomplished by, for example,
removing or renaming the monuments altogether.378 It would mean
changing the “records, evidences, and titles”379 of the Founding by, for
instance, writing new histories of the Founding focusing on its sins.380
This changed constitutional culture would be one in which a Founder
like Washington “is but a man,” and “not of the highest order,”381
rather than a uniquely great figure who represents a complex mixture
of national ideals to which we aspire and national shortcomings we
hope to overcome.382
While this critique of the American Founding often comes from
the political left, a different critique is more associated with the
political right.383 It sees the Founding as the product and embodiment
of political liberalism,384 which these theorists associate primarily with
the political theory of John Locke.385 It regards liberalism as having
created a culture that encourages the severing of social ties,386
materialism,387 loss of meaning,388 and other social pathologies that
simultaneously carry out the logic of liberalism while destroying the
the constitutional theorists I am describing here; nor do I attribute their views to others
whom I cite below as examples of ways of changing constitutional culture.
377 BURKE, supra note 20, at 30.
378 See, e.g., Colleen Grablick, Dozens of D.C. Sites Could Get Renamed or Removed Due to
Ties with Slavery and Racism, NPR (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.npr.org/local/305/2020/09
/02/908752650/dozens-of-d-c-sites-could-get-renamed-or-removed-due-to-ties-with-slaveryand-racism [https://perma.cc/P9CU-C7PX] (describing recommendations of D.C.
working group, which originally “identified figures like Thomas Jefferson, Francis Scott
Key, Ben Franklin and George Washington as problematic candidates for public-works
dedications”). It should be noted that there was confusion and misinformation on social
and other media associated with this report. See DC Mayor Did Not Propose Removing the
Washington Monument, Lincoln Memorial, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 2, 2020), https://
apnews.com/article/9328592189 [https://perma.cc/2LAF-GZXT].
379 BURKE, supra note 20, at 30.
380 See, e.g., The 1619 Project, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www
.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/1619-america-slavery.html
[https://
perma.cc/W5D8-MVKL].
381 BURKE, supra note 20, at 67.
382 See RON CHERNOW, WASHINGTON: A LIFE (2011).
383 Interestingly, Seidman agrees that Vermeule is part of the same movement of
radical skepticism of American constitutionalism that Seidman advocates. See LOUIS
MICHAEL SEIDMAN, FROM PARCHMENT TO DUST: THE CASE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
SKEPTICISM 240 (2021).
384 See, e.g., Patrick J. Deneen, Better than Our Philosophy: A Response to Muñoz, PUB.
DISCOURSE (Nov. 29, 2012), https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/11/7156/
[https://perma.cc/XMT5-YB76].
385 Id.; see also PATRICK J. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED 43–63 (2018).
386 See DENEEN, supra note 385, at 31–34, 43–63.
387 See id. at 9–11, 131–53.
388 See id. at 64–90.
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kind of society necessary for its continuation.389 In this view, America
contained within its Founding the seeds of its own destruction,390 and
only by constructing a new, postliberal constitutional culture founded
on a very different political theory can the society rebuild.391
This is less a critique of the personal character or moral status of
the Founders and more a critique of the ideas undergirding American
constitutional culture. Theorists of this view might try to change those
ideas in various ways,392 but the more ambitious proposals would make
use of the vast powers of the modern administrative state “to sear the
liberal faith with hot irons, to defeat and capture the hearts and minds
of liberal agents, to take over the institutions of the old order that
liberalism has itself prepared and to turn them to the promotion of
human dignity and the common good.”393
Our exploration of the Thomistic and Burkean account of
emotions should prompt us to ask at least two questions in evaluating
these strains of radicalism within American constitutional theory. First,
to the extent that these theorists succeed in severing the affective ties
that the people have with the Founding, will the constitutional culture
that replaces those ties be sufficient to sustain the stability and
durability of our constitutional order? The more committed among
these critics might either answer that the demise of that order is
inevitable394 or that such a demise would be welcome and, given the
many harmful effects of overthrowing a regime, they would need to
justify such a revolutionary result in moral terms.395 But for constitutional theorists who lack such revolutionary aspirations, the question
cannot be avoided. In a culture where Washington “is but a man,” and
“not of the highest order,”396 where the Founding is morally and/or
intellectually bankrupt, will there be the union of reason, emotion,

389
390
391
392
393

Id. at 21–42.
See id.
Id. at 179–98.
For a less radical approach, see id.
Adrian Vermeule, Integration from Within, 2 AM. AFFS. 202 (Spring 2018) (reviewing
PATRICK DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED (2018)), https://americanaffairsjournal.org
/2018/02/integration-from-within/ [https://perma.cc/E39A-X7WP]. Vermeule has yet to
set forth his “common-good” constitutional theory in detail, so what I say here about his
theory is necessarily tentative. It is possible that, when he describes his theory systematically,
he will present it in a less radical fashion. See Adrian Vermeule, Common-Good
Constitutionalism: A Model Opinion, IUS & IUSTITIUM (June 17, 2020), https://iusetiustitium
.com/common-good-constitutionalism-a-model-opinion/
[https://perma.cc/XA4AQ5HZ] (rejecting the notion that his theory was “some sort of alien irruption into our law”).
394 See DENEEN, supra note 385, at 21–42.
395 See supra Section II.C; supra note 261.
396 BURKE, supra note 20, at 67.
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and will necessary to sustain the Constitution that the Founding
produced?397
Second, to the extent that these critics do not succeed in severing
the affective ties that the people have with the Founding but
nonetheless attempt to enact their vision through various centers of
cultural or political power, would the result be analogous to attempts
by reason “to rule the passions [despotically]”: “the passions will erupt
in rebellion”?398 That is, would such efforts to impose a vision of our
Constitution fundamentally at odds with the emotional dispositions of
the American people lead to the kind of social and political instability
that Burke predicted would be the outcome of radical attempts to
remake British or French constitutional culture?
Here, some may wonder if this line of thought terminates in
precisely what I earlier rejected: the imperative to support a Noble Lie.
Am I essentially arguing that these radical critics of the Founding
should refrain from voicing their criticisms and trying to change our
culture because doing so might endanger the regime?399 No, that is
not my view. Burke did not condemn the French revolutionaries for
criticizing and attempting to change their regime; he condemned
their lack of appreciation for the importance of constitutional culture.
He argued that, rather than discard that culture, they could have
appealed to a different tradition within that culture from which to
reform the current regime, or if no such tradition was available, they
could have “follow[ed] wise examples” of similar constitutional
cultures that lacked some of the problems they perceived in their
own.400 As both Matthew Wright and David Bromwich have observed—
commenting on Burke and the importance of the wardrobe of the
moral imagination—Abraham Lincoln was particularly skilled at
appealing to virtuous traditions within American constitutional culture
as a basis for reforming it.401

397 Seidman argues that public officials routinely disobey the Constitution already
without causing instability, but his examples of official disobedience include good-faith
disagreements about what the Constitution actually requires, which is fundamentally
different from adopting a case-by-case approach to whether to obey the Constitution
irrespective of how it is interpreted. SEIDMAN, supra note 370, at 18–19, 63–91. He offers
only one or two contestable examples of the latter in American history. Id.
398 LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 100.
399 SEIDMAN, supra note 370, at 90–91.
400 BURKE, supra note 20, at 32–33.
401 WRIGHT, supra note 182, at 140–45; DAVID BROMWICH, Moral Imagination, in MORAL
IMAGINATION: ESSAYS 3, 17–21 (2014).
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How that model of constitutional reform could be adapted to the
critiques described above is a worthwhile question, and one which
those critics of the Founding would do well to consider.402
C. The Effect on Constitutional Doctrine
Finally, one might justifiably wonder what the Summa Theologiae,
Reflections on the Revolution in France, and concepts like “constitutional
culture” have to do with the actual practice of constitutional law in
American courts. Even if what I have said is true, what is the effect on
constitutional doctrine?
My answer is preliminary, but two possible effects come to mind.
First, there is the indirect effect that emotion plays in the selection of
constitutional methodologies. As I have argued, understanding the
role of emotion in constitutional culture affects our evaluation of, and
perhaps our choice among, theories of constitutional legitimacy.403
Because there is a close relationship between theories of legitimacy
and methodologies of constitutional adjudication,404 and because
methodologies of constitutional adjudication influence doctrine,405
there is a logical connection between understanding the role of
emotion in constitutional theory and the development of constitutional doctrine.
But another, more direct effect is possible. Because “character
traits emerge” from “patterns of interaction between passion and
reason,”406 a long pattern of emotional and rational reinforcement of
a particular idea can lead to a stable character trait, both within the
individual person and within society more broadly.407 One way in
which society’s reasons and emotions receive instruction is through the
law, which performs a teaching function.408 This suggests that, when
402 To his credit, Seidman recently attempted to describe and recover an American
tradition of disobedience to the Constitution to support his radical constitutional theory.
See SEIDMAN, supra note 383, at 178–242. Nonetheless, I respectfully suggest that his effort
fails, since he does not show that the tradition to which he appeals would ensure the stability
and long-term viability of the American regime. Indeed, his approach seems to be, instead,
to deny that our constitutional culture truly does create stability. See id. at 237–42. While I
cannot fully address that argument here, I think the important question to be asked is:
Compared to what? That is, does our current constitutional culture—rooted in popular
sovereignty and obedience to the Constitution—create greater stability than the alternative
Seidman proposes? In my view, the answer is clearly yes.
403 See supra Section III.B.
404 See supra Section III.A.
405 See Alicea, supra note 9, at 61.
406 LOMBARDO, supra note 3, at 101.
407 See supra Parts I–II.
408 See ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC
MORALITY (1993).
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the Supreme Court shapes the law through its decisions, it could—over
the long term—influence the character of the American people for
good or for ill.
For example, in the decades after Miranda v. Arizona,409 the idea
of Miranda warnings or Miranda rights became a familiar part of
popular culture, often serving as the dramatic accompaniment to the
arrest of the villain at the end of a police procedural drama.410 Thirtyfour years later, the Court, in declining to overrule Miranda, relied
heavily on the fact that “Miranda has become embedded in routine
police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of
our national culture.”411 The idea of Miranda rights had been taught
to the American people, and it had become bound up with their
emotional attachment to their constitutional liberties. Miranda, in
other words, had arguably become part of our national character.
This character-forming potential of Supreme Court decisions is
sometimes discussed in the Court’s cases under the rubric of reliance
interests. For instance, in Casey, the Court asserted “the fact that for
two decades of economic and social developments, people ha[d]
organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their
views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the
availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail.”412
The Court said that people had “ordered their thinking and living
around” Roe.413 What the Court was describing was not the
paradigmatic reliance interests at stake in a rule of contract law414: a
mere rational reliance on the notion “that rights thus acquired would
not be disturbed.”415 Rather, the Court said that Roe had played a key
role in “defin[ing] [people’s] views of themselves and their places in
society”416—that is, in defining their character. The Casey dissenters
argued that the Court was wrong about this,417 and I do not contend
that the majority was correct. My point, rather, is that understanding
the role of emotion in the formation of character—and the
extrapolation of those insights to a societal level—helps us see one of

409 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
410 See generally Law & Order (NBC television broadcast 1990–2010).
411 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
412 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).
413 Id.
414 KOZEL, supra note 264, at 28–30.
415 Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 458 (1852).
416 Casey, 505 U.S. at 856.
417 See id. at 956–66 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part); id. at 995–1001 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
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the primary ways in which the Court influences our constitutional
culture.418
It also raises potentially difficult questions for originalists with
respect to stare decisis. Much of modern constitutional doctrine is
non-originalist.419 For those originalists who believe that all erroneous420 (or at least all demonstrably erroneous)421 precedents should be
overruled—that is, those who have a weak conception of stare decisis—
the way in which significant precedents arguably become part of the
constitutional culture that binds the people to their Constitution
forces them to ask: Would the overruling of such precedents
destabilize the people’s attachment to the Constitution? On the other
hand, for those originalists who have a more robust conception of stare
decisis,422 they must ask: Do some or many non-originalist precedents
create or reinforce bad character traits in the American people (i.e.,
vices)?423 Perhaps these questions are inappropriate for judicial
consideration, as Justice Thomas has suggested,424 but for originalists
who view stare decisis as requiring the Court to “scrutinize the
precedent’s real-world effects on the citizenry, not just its effects on the
law and the legal system,” they cannot be discounted.425
My point is not to resolve these doctrinal questions; it is to show
that understanding the role of emotion in constitutional theory
provides a new way to think about them.
CONCLUSION
What is the role of emotion in constitutional theory? Scholars
have almost uniformly either overlooked this question or answered
“none.” But emotion plays a crucial role in binding us to the Constitution; reason alone will not sustain it. We need a complex mixture of
ideas and sentiments to maintain our Constitution over time, and
418 See Gewirtzman, supra note 6, at 627–28 (observing that doctrine influences
constitutional culture); Post, supra note 15, at 77–107 (arguing the same). But see Robert
A. Dahl, Decision-making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB.
L. 279, 283–91 (1957).
419 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian
Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1130–31 (2008).
420 See Lawson, supra note 358, at 5–8; Paulsen, supra note 358, at 289–98 (2008).
421 Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1,
5–8 (2001); see also Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1984–88 (2019) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
422 See, e.g., Baude, supra note 58, at 2358–61.
423 By comparing Roe to Dred Scott, Justice Scalia suggested that he thought that was
true of Roe. Greene, supra note 3, at 1420.
424 Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1988 (Thomas, J., concurring).
425 Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1415 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in
part).
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theories of legitimacy are part of that mixture, that constitutional
culture. A theory of legitimacy that does not accord with our
constitutional culture—that places reason and emotion in
opposition—risks destabilizing the Constitution. We cannot, therefore, ignore the role of emotion in assessing the viability and contours
of theories of legitimacy, and since theories of legitimacy are
foundational to constitutional theory, emotion should play a vital role
in constitutional theory.
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